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A Collision Course Between TRIPS
Flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings
Cynthia M. Ho*
This Article discusses an important, yet understudied threat to patent,
as well as other intellectual property sovereignty under TRIPS: pending and
potential challenges by companies under international agreements protecting
investments. Although such agreements have existed for decades, Philip
Morris and Eli Lilly are blazing a new path for companies to sue countries
they claim interfere with their intellectual property rights through so-called
investor-state arbitrations. These suits seek hundreds of millions in
compensation and even injunctive relief for alleged violations of
internationally agreed intellectual property norms. The suits fundamentally
challenge TRIPS flexibilities at the very time the Declaration on Patent
Protection and Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, as well as the UN
High Level Panel Report seek to encourage countries to utilize them. These
disputes may have a chilling effect on countries that would otherwise consider
following policy recommendations to better utilize TRIPS flexibilities.
Given the importance of this threat to TRIPS and domestic sovereignty, this
Article analyzes the pending disputes and offers some proposals for how to
promote TRIPS flexibilities and sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the areas of intellectual property rights and protection of foreign
investments have coexisted peacefully for decades, they are now on a collision
course. Phillip Morris and Eli Lilly have claimed that alleged violations of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
compromise their “investments” of intellectual property, such that they should be
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financially compensated by countries where they obtained these investments.1
These assertions are not made in the World Trade Organization (WTO) forum.
Rather, they are made under international agreements that permit foreign investors
to bring unique claims against a country before a tribunal of three typically private
attorneys, in a so-called “investor-state” arbitration proceeding.2 Investor-state
claims can exist without regard to compliance with other international agreements,
such as TRIPS, and may exist in agreements that do not have any intellectual
property norms.3 These claims are a creative way for companies to directly challenge
TRIPS despite the fact that they cannot do so at the WTO.4 Moreover, companies
can obtain substantial financial compensation that would not typically be available
at the WTO.5
These investment claims may create havoc concerning TRIPS flexibilities.
Notably, TRIPS only requires countries to provide minimum, but not uniform
standards of protection.6 Because of this, TRIPS is often considered to have builtin flexibilities that permit compliance with TRIPS while also recognizing domestic
priorities.7 Indeed, policy makers have repeatedly recommended countries take
1. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Can., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
[ICSID] Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Eli Lilly,
Notice of Arbitration], http://www.italaw.com/cases/1625 [https://perma.cc/J9AS-CLQ6]; Philip
Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA] Case Repository No. 2012-12,
Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration],
http://www.italaw.com/cases/851 [https://perma.cc/5NYB-39BB]; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl
v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 1 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter
P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration], http://www.italaw.com/documents/PMI-UruguayNoA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U7H-4RXM].
2. This is alternatively called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), or less frequently,
Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration.
3. For example, the Philip Morris dispute against Australia was initiated under a Bilateral
Investment Treaty. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K.,
Sept. 15, 1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 386. Even when investment claims exist in an agreement with IP rules,
they are typically in different parts of a free trade agreement, such as under NAFTA.
4. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (referring to contracting parties, i.e. countries, as the only ones that
can initiate a dispute).
5. The routine remedy in a WTO case is to come into compliance with WTO requirements. See
id. art. 19.1 This may require amending a law. In addition, although a prevailing country could
occasionally obtain financial recourse, that is only if a country fails to bring its laws into compliance. See
id. Moreover, even if this were the case, any monetary compensation would be provided only to the
prevailing country. See id.
6. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1.1,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
7. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 198–201 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi
A. Yusuf eds., 1998) [hereinafter Correa, Patent Rights]; CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION
GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 70–97 (2009); Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs
Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADERELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160, 187 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard
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advantage of these flexibilities in the decades since TRIPS was concluded.8 The
Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS, written by
forty academics, aims to clarify these flexibilities,9 and the recent UN High Level
Panel on Access to Medicines reiterates that these flexibilities should be adopted.10
However, the pending investor-state cases may make states reluctant to take
advantage of these flexibilities. After all, an investment tribunal could require a
nation to pay millions in compensation for an alleged violation of investment
agreement. This possibility could have a substantial chilling effect.
In addition to having a chilling effect on TRIPS flexibilities, investment claims
premised on alleged violations of TRIPS could result in conflicts with the WTO/
TRIPS regime. This seems particularly likely since investor-state tribunals frequently
issue decisions that are criticized as surprising and inconsistent.11 There would be a
direct conflict if a WTO panel and an investment tribunal interpreted the identical
TRIPS provision differently, which is possible since neither system presently
precludes simultaneous or even subsequent litigation. Even if a WTO panel
adjudicated a similar factual situation first, an investor-state tribunal would not be
bound to the WTO decision.12 Notably, although WTO rulings tend to be

Schricker eds., 1996); World Health Org. et al., Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and
Innovation: Intersections Between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade 13, 57, 71–73 (2012).
8. See e.g., Chamber of Deputies Ctr. for Strategic Studies & Debates, BRAZIL’ S PATENT
REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 57, 79 (2013) [hereinafter
BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM ]; CHAN PARK ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, USING LAW
TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION
AND MEDICINES LAW, 15–16, 22 (2013); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.-INT’L
CONFERENCE ON SCI. & TECH. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT 367 (2005); Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Access
to Medicines: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, § 2.6.1 (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter
UN 2016 High Level Panel Report]; Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical
Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective 26 (WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD Working Paper, 2007);
World Health Org. et al., supra note 7, at 209–19.
9. Matthias Lamping et al., Declaration on Patent Protection - Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS,
45 IIC - INT ’ L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679 (2014) [hereinafter Declaration on Patent
Protection].
10. UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, § 2.6.1.
11. See, e.g., August Reinisch, The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceeds and Possible Solutions, in
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTOR ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, 113, 115–117 (Michael
Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International
Investment Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT ’ L L. 91, 99 (2006) [hereinafter van Aaken, Fragmentation of
International Law]; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter
Franck, Legitimacy Crisis]; Federico Ortino, Legal Reasoning of International Investment Tribunals: A
Typology of Egregious Failures, 3 J. INT ’ L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 31 (2012); see also discussion of
inconsistency infra pp. 116-17
12. Not only are the two systems entirely distinct such that a decision in one system is not
binding in another, but investor-state tribunals are not obligated to follow past tribunal rulings. See, e.g.,
Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
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consistent with prior decisions,13 and uniformity is promoted through a standing
Appellate Body,14 there is currently no similar system in place to lend uniformity to
all investor-state disputes.15
The investment cases challenging TRIPS come at a time when there is not
only an explosion of investment cases16 but also significant criticism of investment
claims.17 These investment claims involving IP are arguably expected given that
companies increasingly consider IP a valuable type of investment. However, the
potential for conflict between these two systems seems largely overlooked.
Importantly, even those who vigorously defend investment claims fail to recognize
the collision course between TRIPS and investment claims. This Article aims to
address this gap and show why existing defenses of investment claims fail to address
the unique problems with challenging international IP norms in investment cases.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides fundamental background
to the initial investment disputes by explaining the relevant law and policy of
intellectual property, as well as investment state arbitration. It also documents the
current under-recognition of the inherent problems of challenging international IP
norms through investment arbitration. Part II discusses the facts and claims of the
initial disputes impacting TRIPS, including policy problems. It also discusses
possible future cases that may arise. Part III then explores possible ways to minimize
the present collision course between IP agreements and investment agreements.

13. E.g., Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part
Two of A Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT ’ L L. & POL’ Y 1 (1999) (WTO tends to operate with de facto stare
decisis).
14. DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.
15. See infra note 78 and accompanying text However, in two recent agreements, there is an
appeals tribunal. See Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, art. 8.28, COM (2016) 0443 ( July 5, 2016) [hereinafter
CETA]; EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed Text as of January 2016, art. 13 (Feb. 1,
2016) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437
[https://perma.cc/U34F-FTLF]. Although this is a notable change, it is still different than the WTO
system in that the appeals would only be for that single agreement and would not result in uniformity
amongst all investment agreements.
16. Whereas the first investment treaty arbitration was only in 1987, from 2012–2014, between
forty and sixty claims were filed each year, with over 600 claims currently pending in over fifty countries.
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS, at 5, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Recent Trends]; U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Updated for the Multilateral Dialogue on Investment, at 2–3,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/REV (2013); see also Burghard Ilge, Both Ends,
To Change a BIT is Not Enough: On the Need to Create Sound Policy Frameworks for Investment 6
(2015) (only nineteen known cases in 1997, but at least one new case every week in 2015),
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/to-change-a-bit-is-not-enough/ [https://perma.cc/RCG8-3CFE]. The
number of claims continues to grow. In 2016, nearly 1000 new cases were filed involving 3000 parties
from over 1000 countries. ICC Reveals Record Number of New Arbitration Cases Filed in 2016, INT ’ L
CHAMBER COM. ( Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.iccwbo.be/icc-reveals-record-number-of-newarbitration-cases-filed-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/GGY7-6LVX].
17. See infra Part I.B.3.
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part lays the groundwork to understand the initial landmark cases
challenging TRIPS issues through investment arbitration. Part A explains
intellectual property law and policy, including the current international landscape.
Part B explains international agreements permitting investor-state claims.
Understanding their genesis, including underlying policy reasons, is critical to
illuminate the present conflict. Section B explains not only investment law, but some
basics of key claims that are at issue in both cases, including “expropriation” of
investments, as well as when a company has purportedly been denied “fair and
equitable treatment.”18 Section C then addresses the largely unrecognized conflict
for TRIPS flexibilities in investment arbitration.
A. Intellectual Property Law and Policy
Traditionally, the existence and scope of intellectual property rights were solely
a function of domestic policy concerning which interests a nation wanted to foster.
Intellectual property rights were understood to impose a social cost in that such
rights generally result in higher priced goods. Some countries viewed some goods,
such as drugs, to be an area where the social cost of patent protection should be
viewed skeptically in light of an interest in ensuring that drugs are not priced beyond
reach.19
Today, however, most countries do not have the luxury of designing
intellectual property laws solely based on domestic policy. This is because over 160
countries are members of the WTO, which requires compliance with the
“minimum” levels of intellectual property rights under TRIPS.20 TRIPS is
considered a landmark agreement that for the first time requires countries to
provide patent rights. Under TRIPS, all member countries (except Least Developed
Countries) must now provide patent protection regardless of their policy
preferences.21
Although it is well known that TRIPS requires “minimum,” but not uniform
standards,22 the “minimum” standards have been hotly contested. This is partly a
18. These are unique claims to investment suits. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Correa, Patent Rights, supra note 7, at 192 (over 50 countries did not provide patents
on drugs prior to TRIPS).
20. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https:/perma.cc/AJZ4-U4SZ]
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
21. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015); TRIPS,
supra note 6, art. 27.
22. The fact that TRIPS only requires minimum standards is underscored by the fact that
subsequent to TRIPS, parties attempted, but failed, to adopt an international agreement requiring
uniform standards that would not have been necessary if TRIPS had such standards already. E.g.,
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical
Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89–90 (2007).
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function of the fact that TRIPS does not define key aspects of the minimum
standards. For example, although TRIPS states that members must grant patents
for “inventions” if they meet certain criteria such as being “new,” having an
“inventive step,” and being “capable of industrial application,” TRIPS leaves these
key terms undefined.23 Before TRIPS, countries often defined these terms
differently and because TRIPS requires minimum instead of uniform standards,
continued flexibility seems to have been contemplated.24 Accordingly, scholars, as
well as policy makers, believe that countries retain substantial discretion in deciding
these terms.25
Importantly, although WTO countries are now required to provide intellectual
property rights, this does not indicate that all WTO countries believe this is good
domestic policy. Some countries, such as India, resisted incorporating intellectual
property rights into the WTO/TRIPS framework and also tried to minimize the
scope of obligations.26 There are a variety of theories on why developing countries
agreed to TRIPS, but not one of them suggests that such countries were agreeing
that it was good policy to adopt stronger intellectual property rights. Rather, the
theories range from ignorance of the impact of TRIPS, to the fact that TRIPS
should be considered a treaty of adhesion.27
On the other hand, the existence of TRIPS does reflect the fact that some
countries, and especially some industries (such as pharmaceutical companies), were
desirous of stronger global protection that led to TRIPS. Until TRIPS, there was no
multilateral international agreement mandating any type of intellectual property
protection exist. Previously, multilateral agreements primarily aimed to help
inventors more easily obtain global protection if a country elected to provide it.28
23. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27.
24. Notably, not only were there different definitions of these terms, but TRIPS even permits
slightly different key terms, stating, for example, that a country can require an invention to be “useful”
or have “industrial application” even though these terms are not interchangeable. See TRIPS, supra note
6, art. 27.
25. E.g., E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around
the World, 30:1 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 35 (2014); Correa, Patent Rights, supra note 7, at 198–
00; Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 89; PARK, supra note 8, at 39; UNITED NATIONS
DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 8, at 57; UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 22.
26. E.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, art. III, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100147.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HUC-SVFJ]
(proposing limiting scope of IP in WTO); see also A.V. Ganesan, Negotiating for India, in THE MAKING
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
211, 213–14 ( Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (noting that India resisted including IP
as not adequately trade related and concerned about the impact on affordable medicine).
27. E.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,
373 (2006); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27
U. PA. J. INT ’ L L. 681, 691 (2014).
28. E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 3–4, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, arts. 2–3 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 (last amended Sept. 28, 1979) (showing that if a nation provided patents, it could not treat
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But now, although many countries and some scholars consider TRIPS to require
too much IP protection, some developed countries such as the United States have
sought and continue to seek international agreements requiring even more
protection.29 These “TRIPS-plus” agreements are often bilateral agreements with
developing countries that may sign agreements to gain desired market access
without fully understanding the implications of the intellectual property
provisions.30 Scholars consider these TRIPS-plus agreements savvy forum shifting
by countries that did not obtain optimal levels of protection under TRIPS31 and also
note how TRIPS-plus agreements reduce TRIPS flexibilities.32 In a similar fashion,
the companies now bringing landmark investment claims may be shifting to the
investment tribunal forum to seek remedies that they cannot obtain in the WTO
directly or even by lobbying their governments which often exercise substantial
discretion in deciding what claims to challenge at the WTO.33
Against the upward ratcheting of IP standards, some counter-movements
promote the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The Doha Public Health Declaration, for
its nationals better than foreign applicants); Patent Cooperation Treaty June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645,
1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (Oct. 3, 2001) (providing a mechanism to help inventors more easily obtain patents
in multiple countries with a single application if countries provided patents).
29. E.g., RUTH MAYNE, HUMAN DEV. REPORT OFFICE, UNDP, REGIONALISM,
BILATERALISM AND THE TRIPS PLUS AGREEMENTS: THE THREAT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1 (2005), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2005_mayne_ruth_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N832-KKZW]; Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 866–69 (2007);
DEERE, supra note 7, at 113–42.
30. E.g., MAYNE, supra note 29, at 6–8.
31. See, e.g., Susan Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and
TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP L. 447, 454 (2011) [hereinafter Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough]. Of course,
this is not the first instance of forum shifting. Incorporating IP standards in the WTO framework is
generally considered a landmark forum shift that was orchestrated not just by countries, but also by a
few powerful industries that successfully lobbied their governments. E.g., SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE
POWER, PUBLIC LAW (2003).
32. E.g., CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 223–51 (2011) [hereinafter HO,
ACCESS TO MEDICINE] (providing an overview of TRIPS-plus standards and how they limit TRIPS
flexibilities); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Under BITs, FTAs and
TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 485, 490–93 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds. 2011) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights]; Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough, supra note 31, at 454.
33. See, e.g., James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement from
the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914650
[https://perma.cc/YNF43K42]; see also Valentina S. Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and
Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113, 142 (2015) [hereinafter Vadi,
Towards a New Dialectics] (noting that as TRIPS disputes have declined, there are now IP-related
investment disputes). In fact, some have specifically noted how investment-state arbitrations can be
considered TRIPS Plus. E.g., LUKAS VANHONNAEKER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS: FROM COLLISION TO COLLABORATION 177–86 (2015). But see
Bertram Boie, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is there
a TRIPS-Plus Dimension? 40–44 (NCCR Trade, Working Paper No. 2010/19, 2010) (noting that
although BITs may require more than TRIPS, they arguably address different subject matter, such that
they are not TRIPS-plus, so much as incongruent).
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example, affirmed that members have flexibility in implementing TRIPS in a way
that protects public health.34 Since then, some countries have adopted or considered
adopting national laws to better incorporate TRIPS flexibilities.35 The need to
incorporate TRIPS flexibilities was recently underscored by the September 2016
Report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Access
to Medicine, which it issued after public hearings worldwide.36 However, the use of
these flexibilities may be threatened by the pending disputes premised on alleged
TRIPS violations. Indeed, although the initial investment disputes involve only
three countries, they seem designed to influence the laws of other countries that are
not formal members of these disputes.37
B. Investment Agreements (Permitting Investor-State Arbitration)
There are currently over 3,000 international agreements that provide “foreign”
investors to a particular country with certain rights concerning their investments, as
well as a mechanism to enforce these rights before a tribunal of private arbitrators.38
The vast majority of these agreements are bilateral investment agreements.39
However, recent trade agreements include a chapter on investment agreements, as
well as chapters on other topics such as intellectual property rights.40 This Section
34. World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (“we
affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO members’ right to . . . promote access to medicines for all.”).
35. India, Argentina and the Philippines have already adopted some TRIPS flexibilities. E.g.,
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, India Code (2005) [hereinafter India
Patents (Amendment) Act]; Republic of the Philippines, Congress of the Philippines, Republic Act
No. 9502 ( June 6, 2008), http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9502_2008.html
[https://perma.cc/3LTT-7J3H]; Non-patentable Subject Matter according to the New Guidelines of the
Argentine PTO, MOELLER IP ADVISORS, ( June 24, 2013), http://www.moellerip.com/non-patentablesubject-matter-according-to-the-new-guidelines-of-the-argentine
[https://perma.cc/
HD9A-Z4KZ]; see also Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295 (2014-2015). Countries that are contemplating following suit include Brazil and
South Africa. See, e.g., Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (Sept. 2013) (S. Afr.), http://ipunit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/DRAFT-IP-POLICY.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LRY-Y6Q6];
Catherine Tomlinson et al., Reforming South Africa’s Procedures for Granting Patents to Improve Medicine
Access, 105 S. AF. MED. J. 741 (2015); BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM, supra note 8.
36. See UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 22.
37. E.g., Ruth Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT ’ L L. 1121, 1121–22 (2014); see also Gathii &
Ho, supra note 33 (arguing that these initial disputes indicate an intent to shift from the WTO/TRIPS
regime to the use of investment disputes to effectuate policy changes in domestic and global laws).
38. E.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND
ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales
No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010) [hereinafter UNCTAD, INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES].
39. E.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., Investment Policy Hub: International Investment
Agreements Navigator (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/GTR8FYBK] (showing that there are over 2,900 bilateral investment treaties, but fewer than 400 other types
of agreements).
40. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE
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explains the unique claims, and how they are enforced, followed by criticisms of this
system. This Section primarily focuses on the similarities among the majority of
existing agreements, including criticisms of such agreements, although
modifications in a few recent agreements are also addressed at the end of the
Section.
1. Background
Agreements permitting investor-state arbitrations have been introduced since
1959 to promote foreign direct investment in countries.41 They were largely
introduced in agreements by newly independent countries desirous of encouraging
foreign investments.42 The new rights and mechanism for enforcement were
intended to address a myriad of prior problems that often discouraged investments.
For example, foreign investors might be loath to purchase property in a state when
they know they could be the target of unlawful state action (i.e., taking their
purchase without compensation), and not have recourse. Lack of recourse might
exist because the nation did not have a robust rule of law, because the government
had sovereign immunity, or because the judgment was not enforceable. Investors
often had to seek intervention by their governments, which usually took the form
of military interventions, often referred to as “gunboat diplomacy.”43 Against this
backdrop, new claims specific to foreign investors, as well as a method to enforce
them, were created to mitigate risks and induce foreign investment.44
Investment agreements generally provide the same basic set of enforceable
substantive rights to investors intended to contribute to a stable investment
climate.45 Some of the rights clearly aim to put foreign investors on a level playing
field with domestic ones. For example, there is usually a guarantee that foreign

REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) [hereinafter TPP], https://ustr.gov/tpp/
[https://perma.cc/9NLT-EBSB].
41. See generally U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN
THE MID 1990S, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8, 8–10 (1998) (showing
that Germany and Pakistan signed the first such agreement in 1959); see also Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2d ed. 2012) (showing that although international
agreements to promote investments date back to the late 1700s, they were limited in scope to
expropriation and importantly lacked arbitration-type remedies common in modern agreements).
42. E.g., UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 38, at 3–4; LORENZO COTULA,
INT’L INST. FOR ENV ’ T & DEV., INVESTMENT TREATIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION 1 (2014).
43. E.g., KENNETH VANDEVALDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 7 (1992); see also Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 15–17 (2014)
(discussing gunboat diplomacy as well as broader historical context). Alternatively, investors sometimes
sought to have their home country make a claim on their behalf at the International Court of Justice,
but that resulted in only a small number of successful claims and even those that were successful did
not result in any compensation to the investor and were not truly enforceable without enactment of a
Security Council Resolution. See, e.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1536–37.
44. E.g., VANDEVELDE, supra note 43, at 7.
45. E.g. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 146–51 (2d ed. 2015).

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

A COLLISION COURSE

405

investors will not be treated less favorably than domestic ones and that they will be
free from unreasonable or discriminatory measures; this is referred to as “national
treatment.”46 Similarly, most agreements require that investors be provided the most
favored nation treatment such that foreign investors under one agreement are
provided no less favorable treatment than foreign investors under a different
agreement.47
However, there are two other core obligations in most agreements that may
provide investors with more rights than domestic ones and are of particular issue
concerning intellectual property claims.48 First, states are prohibited from
expropriating investments without compensation.49 Although somewhat analogous
to domestic takings laws in most countries, the interpretation is often broader than
under domestic laws.50 Second, states are required to provide minimum standards
of treatment to foreign investments, which is often referred to as “fair and equitable
treatment” (FET).51 Although some aspects of what could constitute an FET claim
might have parallels in domestic law such as denial of due process and undue
discrimination, such claims generally have no true parallel to the extent that they
focus on protecting alleged “legitimate expectations” of investors.52
FET claims deserve special discussion not only since investors tend to prevail
on these, but also because they are more likely to create problems with IP norms
given their broad scope. The concept of “legitimate expectations” was first

46. E.g., id. at 149; U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3 (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT].
47. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art.4; SALACUSE, supra note 45, at 149. E.g.,
Claudia Salomon & Sandra Friedrich, How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment
Treaties Affect Arbitration, PRACTICAL LAW ARBITRATION, 3–4 (2013), https://m.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-clauses-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/WL4U-9QRW]
(showing that although the original intent would seem reasonable, it has been used creatively to expand
protection).
48. Nations that promote such rights, however, often misrepresent this issue. See, e.g., InvestorState Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Fact Sheet, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015)
[hereinafter ISDS Fact Sheet], https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/
2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https://perma.cc/JB7N-RATQ] (alleging that
claims under investment agreements simply “mirror” U.S. rights and are “designed to provide no greater
substantive rights to foreign investors than are afforded under . . . U.S. law.”).
49. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art. 6; NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110.
50. E.g., Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 37 (2003); LISE JOHNSON ET. AL, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV.,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND US DOMESTIC LAW, 1, 7 (May
2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-andU.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KX6-PZEL].
51. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105; TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6; SALACUSE, supra note
45, at 241 (noting that this is a requirement of “virtually all investment treaties” even though
formulations differ).
52. E.g., Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments”
and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT ’ L ARB. 361, 381–82 (2013) (noting that
protection of expectations, versus actual rights, provides investors more protection against regulatory
change than under U.S. domestic law).
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mentioned by a tribunal in 2003 and is now considered “so general a provision [that
it] is likely to be almost sufficient to cover all conceivable cases.”53 In addition, even
though tribunals have stated that defeat of legitimate expectations alone is not an
automatic breach of FET, it nonetheless can be given significant weight, arguably
disproportionately, in ultimately finding a violation of an FET claim.54 Recent
expansive interpretations of FET claims have resulted in a proliferation of claims;
this stands in stark contrast to previous decades where the standard was rarely
invoked because it was considered only applicable where action was egregious and
shocking.55
An important aspect of modern investment claims is the process for
addressing these claims, including how it is dramatically different than most
adjudications. Investment claims are a unique aspect of international law that permit
private companies to assert a claim against a state.56 The ability of a company to sue
a host state directly is considered an unprecedented “revolutionary innovation” in
international law that usually involves only state-to-state interactions.57 In addition,
how the claims are adjudicated is also notable. Investment claims are decided by a
tribunal of three individuals that lacks the independence of most domestic and
international courts.58 There is also a high level of confidentiality regarding not only
hearings, but also written submissions; this means that generally only parties to the
53. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for
the Protection and Promotion of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT ’ L L. 241, 243 (1981).
54. E.g., Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection Under Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economic
Analysis 167–68 (2014); Clayton v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability,
¶ 572 (Mar. 17, 2015); see also LISE JOHNSON & LISA SACHS, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV.,
THE TPP’S INVESTMENT CHAPTER: ENTRENCHING, RATHER THAN REFORMING, A FLAWED
SYSTEM 5 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2015/11/18/the-tpps-investment-chapter-entrenchingrather-than-reforming-a-flawed-system [https://perma.cc/5YUX-UNR7].
55. E.g., Bryan Mercurio Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in
International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT ’ L ECON. L. 871, 894 (2012) [hereinafter Mercurio,
Awakening]; see also Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment
in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 297, 298 (2005). The standard dates back
to a 1926 case concerning international standards in which a tribunal held that to violate international
standards, treatment of an alien should amount to “an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty,
or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would recognize its insufficiency.” Neer v. United Mexican States, 4
R.I.A.A. 60, 61–62 (Mex.-U.S.A. Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926); see also Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S.
v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 128 ( July 20) (noting that state arbitrariness would require “willful disregard of
due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises a sense of judicial propriety”).
56. E.g., Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 433, 434–35 (Waibel et al. eds.,
2010) [hereinafter Van Harten, Perceived Bias].
57. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 145 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 24,
2007) (“profound transformation of international investment law”); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without
Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995) (“dramatically different from anything previously known in the
international sphere”).
58. E.g., Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT ’ L L. 387, 397
(2014); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 521–22 (1997); Van Harten,
Perceived Bias, supra note 56, at 439.
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dispute have full access to all the information.59 Under the vast majority of
agreements, the tribunal is also not required to permit interested third parties to
participate.60 Finally, there is currently no possibility of appeal in all but two of over
3000 agreements.61 Awards can theoretically be annulled,62 but the conditions are
very limited.63 Although these features are radically different than most adjudicatory
systems, they are based on earlier international commercial arbitration between
private parties for whom confidentiality was considered essential.64 However, as will
be discussed in the next section, investment claims inherently involve public
matters, such that the model for private parties may be a poor fit.

59. E.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1544–45.
60. E.g., Jeffery Atik, Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter
11 Process, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE,
FUTURE PROSPECTS 135, 147 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004). The trend in recently concluded and pending
agreements is toward more transparency and participation. However, that has no retroactive impact on
older agreements.
61. The EU has included an appeal process in its agreement with Vietnam, as well as with
Canada, and the proposed agreement with the US. See EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 15; CETA, supra
note 15, art. 8.27–.28; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection
and Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015). In addition, although its success is uncertain, the EU has
proposed a multilateral investment court. Appeals could be introduced in other agreements. See The
Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUR. COMM’N (Dec 21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 [https://perma.cc/7QVT-FX6S].
62. E.g., Letter from Payam Akhavan, Associate Professor, McGill University, et al., to Harry
Reid, U.S. S. Minority Leader, et al. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter
[https://perma.cc/J6PY-RSU9] [hereinafter April 2015 Letter] (stating that “[a]wards are subject to
review either in national courts or by ad hoc annulment committees composed of representatives drawn
from rosters created by states”).
63. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 UNTS. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention] (permitting annulment if the tribunal was not properly constituted, the tribunal manifestly
exceeded its powers, there was corruption by a member, there was a serious departure from a
fundamental rule of procedure, or the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based);
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
art. 34 (1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW2W-FV7E]
(limited grounds for setting aside an award). Moreover, attempts to annul are generally unsuccessful.
E.g., UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that all five applications for annulment in
2014 were entirely rejected). But see Promod Nair & Claudia Ludwig, ICSID Annulment Awards: Time
for Reform? 5 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 18, 19–20 (2010) (suggesting that in some cases, annulment
proceedings have been more akin to appellate review despite lack of support from language of ICSID).
The lack of review of such awards was recently reinforced when the U.S. Supreme Court held that
domestic courts must not review their merits. BC Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134
S. Ct. 1198, 1212 (2014).
64. E.g., Frank Garcia et al, Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from
International Trade Law, 18 J. INT ’ L ECON. L. 861 (2015).
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2. Criticism of Investment Claims
Although investment claims and the investor-state system were originally
applauded for promoting investment flows,65 they are now highly controversial.66
There are several key criticisms that will be explained in this section. A major issue
is that investment claims are often expansively interpreted in favor of investors.
Moreover, investment claims can be interpreted inconsistently. This results in a
serious chilling effect—especially given the increasing number of claims and
significant awards. A related issue is the lack of democratic accountability by
tribunals. After discussing each of these criticisms, recent initiatives aimed at
addressing criticisms will be explained, including why these fail to fully address
problems relating to TRIPS issues.
A major issue with investment claims is their expansive interpretation.
Although most agreements have similar protections, they tend to leave key terms
undefined.67 Even newer generation agreements that provide factors to consider for
either expropriation or FET claims, still leave much discretion in the hands of
tribunals since they provide no guidance on how to weigh and balance broad
factors.68 Moreover, since investment claims primarily exist in bilateral investment
agreements that focus on investments, undefined terms, as well as ambiguities, may
be resolved in favor of investors because of the lack of competing language in the

65. E.g., David P. Riesenberg, Note, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 985 (2011).
66. E.g., Simon Lester, The ISDS Controversy: How We Got Here and Where Next, INT’ L
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.: OPINION ( June 1, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/
opinion/the-isds-controversy-how-we-got-here-and-where-next [https://perma.cc/F5EQ-ZSV9];
Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-disputesettlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/G2JF-5KGV]; The Arbitration Game: Governments
are Souring on Treaties to Protect Foreign Investors, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http://
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treatiesprotect-foreign-investors-arbitration [https://perma.cc/P336-GJSE]. For example, the E.U. initiated a
public consultation to address concern about whether to include an investment chapter in its pending
agreement with the US. European Commission Press Release IP/14/56, Commission to Consult
European Public on Provisions in EU-US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute
Settlement ( Jan. 21, 2014).
67. For example, most agreements provide for FET claims without any reference point by
which to determine the standard. E.g., Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—Intellectual
Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, 6
J. INT ’ L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 252, 265 (2015) [hereinafter Mercurio, Safeguarding ]. Accordingly,
there remains significant uncertainty concerning the scope of such claims, as well as the potential for
them to be interpreted expansively. E.g., Lee M. Caplan & Jeremy K. Sharpe, United States, in
COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 755, 756 (Chester Brown ed., 2013);
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN ET AL., LSE ENTERPRISE, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EU-USA
INVESTMENT
PROTECTION
TREATY
29
(2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260380/bis-13-1284-costs-and-benefits-of-an-euusa-investment-protection-treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QYG-89FN].
68. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, Annex B.4(a); CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(1)–
(4); see also Mercurio, Safeguarding, supra note 67, at 259–60.
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treaty to promote public interest goals.69 In addition, tribunals sometimes interpret
agreements in favor of investors without textual support. For example, even though
FET claims under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are
expressly linked to violations of international law, which should require general and
consistent practice of states,70 some NAFTA tribunals have found FET violations
without considering international law.71 Critics of investment claims often express
concern about investor-friendly rulings.72 Not only critics but also some defenders
have noted investment agreements have become an economic bill of rights solely
for foreign investors since corporations generally have rights, but no duties, whereas
host states have duties, but no rights.73 Even some arbitrators have themselves
69. E.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 ( Jan. 29, 2004) (“It is legitimate to resolve
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.”); Siemens
A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004)
(referring to treaty purpose as “to protect” and “to promote” investments).
70. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105(1).
71. For example, in Metalclad, a tribunal found Mexico in violation of FET under
NAFTA, which requires such claims to be tied to minimum standards of treatment under
customary international law, which in turn means a general and consistent practice of all states,
without actually examining customary international law. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States,
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award, paras. 74–101 (Aug. 30, 2000) (discussing expropriation,
but never actually addressing what constitutes customary international law before finding a
violation). Similarly, in Railroad Development Corporation, the NAFTA tribunal arguably failed to
consider customary international law when it found that customary international law can be a
developing standard. R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,
Award, para. 218 ( June 29, 2012) (not evaluating customary international law and instead alleging it
can be a developing standard); see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II: A SEQUEL, at xv, 11 (2012); Matthew C. Porterfield,
A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment under Customary
International Law by Investment Tribunals, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fairand-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investment-tribunals/ [https://
perma.cc/FV3G-55KR]. Indeed, by 2001 after several NAFTA panels interpreted this requirement to
go beyond customary international law, NAFTA parties issued an interpretative note attempting to
cabin the scope of this standard. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter 11 Provisions ( July 31, 2001), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23PZ-MCYZ]. However, this has not completely solved the problem. E.g., Saluka
Inv. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 309 (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Mar. 17, 2006), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DRQ-CCHY]
(considering FET unmoored to customary international law).
72. E.g., Gus Van Harten, et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime
(Aug. 31, 2010), [hereinafter Van Harten, Public Statement] http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/publicstatement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ [https://perma.cc/NW53-N9RA]
(public statement of academics criticizing pro-investor interpretations); A. Claire Cutler, New
Constitutionalism, Democracy and the Future of Global Governance, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE 89, 103–04 (Stephen Gill ed., 2015);
see also van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 11, at 126 (“it seems fair to say that
tribunals have been on the whole rather investor friendly” although noting that a few recent decisions
or minority opinions have taken a different approach).
73. E.g., THE SEATTLE TO BRUSSELS NETWORK ET AL., A TRANSATLANTIC CORPORATE
BILL OF RIGHTS: INVESTOR PRIVILEGES IN EU-US TRADE DEAL THREATEN PUBLIC INTEREST
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expressed concern in recent years concerning expansive interpretations.74 In
addition to expansive interpretations of investment claims, many have criticized
tribunals for expansively interpreting who is considered a foreign investor; tribunals
are criticized for blessing “nationality shopping,” which refers to a phenomenon
whereby companies re-incorporate or incorporate subsidiaries to take advantage of
investment agreements, such as in the Philip Morris case.75
A related issue to expansive investor-friendly rulings is that they are often
inconsistent. On one level, inconsistency should be expected since agreements have
different language. However, tribunals have interpreted identical wording in
different ways.76 The UN Conference on Trade and Development has recently
noted that contradictions between awards is a major concern, especially in light of
a proliferation of cases.77 The inconsistency is exacerbated by the lack of any

AND DEMOCRACY (2013), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/transatlanticcorporate-bill-of-rights-oct13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCD-MQ3X]; Susan D. Franck, Empirically
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007).
74. E.g., Fauwaz Abdul Aziz, Investor-state Arbitration System Needs ‘Complete Overhaul’,
BILATERALS.ORG, (May 12, 2014), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investor-state-arbitration-system
[https://perma.cc/P2GK-L2X2] (noting prominent lawyer who has served as counsel in several
investment cases expressed problem in keynote address to annual Investment Treaty Arbitration
Conference).
75. Jane Kelsey & Lori Wallach, “Investor-State” Disputes in Trade Pact Threaten Fundamental
Principles of National Judicial Systems, PUB. CITIZEN 3 (Apr. 2012), http://www.citizen.org/
documents/isds-domestic-legal-process-background-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH7-9G6Z];
Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing
Treaty Language and the Concept of “Investor”, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION 3 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); see also Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case
of International Investment Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) (noting extreme case in
Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine in which Ukrainian investors incorporated in Lithuania and then used that
to invest back in Ukraine). Some suggest that these broad interpretations are a function of the fact that
arbitrators are paid by the hour such that they have an incentive for suits to continue. E.g., Gus Van
Harten, A Report on the Flawed Proposals for Investor-State Dispute Settlement ( ISDS) in TTIP and
CETA 3 (Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Research Paper No. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Van Harten, Flawed
Proposals] (noting that salaries are a function of whether a case continues). Although the Australian
panel properly rejected this attempt, future tribunals of course need not follow that approach. Philip
Morris v. Austl., Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015)
[hereinafter P.M. v. Austl., Award], http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VUN-W4M4].
76. For example, several cases against Argentina were decided by tribunals with the same
President, but used different interpretations and reached differing conclusions regarding the same basic
facts. E.g., Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 603, 642–43 (2012); see
also Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 12, at 1196–98 (identical wording interpreted differently);
Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s Regulatory Autonomy
Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT ’ L ARB. 245, 253 (2012) (noting divergent interpretation
of comparable factual and legal cases in Lauder v. Czech Republic and CME v. Czech Republic).
77. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement:
In Search of a Roadmap, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (May 24, 2013).
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appellate body under virtually all agreements.78 In fact, even defenders of the current
system have acknowledged this problem.79
The expansive and inconsistent rulings lead to the most significant criticism
of investment claims—that they have a chilling effect on legitimate domestic action.
Notably, companies might be inclined to file claims that have a limited chance of
success in hopes of encouraging governments to settle, which usually favors
companies.80 However, chilling effects are not solely a result of actual claims;
legitimate action can also be suppressed because of specific threats, or even the
possibility of action. For example, some countries declined to enact plain-package
tobacco laws after specific threats, whereas other countries, such as New Zealand,
delayed enacting contemplated legislation even though not specifically threatened.81
Even more concerning, countries might fail to even begin to take legitimate
regulatory or legislative action for fear of potential claims. Some of these chilling
effects can be hard to document and there are admittedly often multiple variables
that impact domestic action.82 However, there is adequate evidence such that

78. E.g., id. at 8–9. Of course, there is an appeal possible under two current agreements. See, e.g.,
supra note 61.
79. E.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1617–25; Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note
12, at 1201–03. However other defenders of investment agreements may not view this as problematic.
E.g., Stephen Schwebel, In Defense of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 135 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES,
Nov. 24, 2014, at 2, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-135-Schwebel-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M3LV-7LTU] (comparing inconsistency to conflicts between state and federal
courts in the United States); José E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM.
SOC’ Y INT ’ L L. PROC. 94, 97 (2005) (noting that inconsistent rulings are inherent to the existing
structure of the dispute settlement and differing treaty texts).
80. E.g., POULSEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 28, 30.
81. Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Industry Tactics Limit Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1; see also John Muchangi, Why MPs Should Pass Tobacco
Regulations, STAR (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/03/30/whymps-should-pass-tobacco-regulations_c1109267 [https://perma.cc/9HWW-D64Y] (detailing the
efforts of tobacco companies to derail efforts to enact regulations in Kenya); Rachel Rose
Jackson, Tobacco Industry Accused of ‘Intimidation and Interference’ in Kenya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/02/tobacco-industry-accusedintimidation-interference-kenya [https://perma.cc/8UJE-Y92P]; Cancer Action Network, TPP Fact
Sheet, May 2015; Tobacco Institute of South Africa, Submission on Draft Regulations in Terms
of Section 37(3) of the Namibian Tobacco Products Control Act, 2010 (2011), http://
www.fairwarning.org/2012/11/as-nations-try-to-snuff-out-smoking-cigarette-makers-use-tradetreaties-to-fire-up-legal-challenges/4tisanamibia2011-dec-14/ [https://perma.cc/Q6Y5-JGNV].
82. E.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political
Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 609 (Chester Brown
& Kate Miles eds., 2011) (“[R]egulatory chill does not lend itself to statistical analysis.”).

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

412

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 6:395

scholars and policy makers have expressed concern.83 In addition, the concern has
become part of mainstream public discussions.84
Another major issue of concern is the inherently public-private nature of
disputes that lacks democratic accountability under most existing agreements.
Investor-state disputes inherently involve disputes of public policy and domestic
regulation, yet are generally decided by tribunals that lack the hallmarks of a
democratic process to protect public interest.85 Under most agreements, the
arbitrators are not independent and lack job security common to most courts; an
arbitrator in one case can also serve as an attorney for a party in another case, which
would never happen in a traditional judicial setting.86 Notably, although the model
of decision making is borrowed from traditional commercial arbitration, there are
some key differences. First, investor claims are more likely to raise public policy
issues than disputes between private parties; whereas confidentiality in commercial

83. Rep. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, ¶ 35 ( July 2, 2003) (warning that investor-state arbitrations could
have a chilling effect on efforts to promote human rights and a healthy environment); see also Rep. of
the Indep. Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable Int’l Order Alfred-Maurice de
Zayas, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/44 ( July 14, 2015); Peter Muchlinski, Trends in
International Investments: Balancing Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate: the Issue of National
Security, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008–2009, 35, 39–
40 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment
Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives 111 (2003); Letter
from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the Univ. of Cal., Irvine School of Law, et al., to Harry Reid,
U.S. S. Minority Leader, et al. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRM9-VG59] [hereinafter March 2015 Letter] (noting
that investor challenges threaten domestic sovereignty); Van Harten, Flawed Proposals, supra note 75, at
7–11 (2015).
84. Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System that Lets Corporations Sue
Countries, THE GUARDIAN ( June 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/DF33D65E]; Glyn Moody, Corporate Sovereignty’s Chilling Effects, TECHDIRT (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:03
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141121/07460329216/corporate-sovereigntys-chillingeffects.shtml [https://perma.cc/AW66-TCCL]; Danielle Kurtzleben, Why Elizabeth Warren is
Declaring War on an Obscure Trade Policy, VOX (last updated Feb. 28, 2015, 12:30 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/2/28/8124057/investor-state-dispute-settlement-elizabeth-warren
[https://perma.cc/B54X-PXA8].
85. E.g., Barnali Choudhury, Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersection of Investment
Arbitration and Human Rights, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 983 (2009); Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in
International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT ’ L L. 367, 385–93 (2014).
86. NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., INT ’ L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY: EXAMINING THE DUAL ROLE OF ARBITRATOR
AND COUNSEL (2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_arbitrator_independence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E2EH-HB2S]; see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 44 (OECD Working Papers on
International Investment, Working Paper No. 2012/3, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/
inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP9A-4EMC] (stating that a majority of
arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases whereas about 10% of arbitrators have
acted as counsel for states in other cases).
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arbitration is not controversial, it is for disputes involving wider policy issues.87
Second, unlike commercial arbitration claims between private parties that only arise
because of an explicit consent in an agreement to the dispute, no such consent is
generally required for an investor-state claim state since the agreement itself is
considered consent for all disputes that arise after the conclusion of the agreement.88
This general consent for future investor-state claims has been considered to be a
“blank cheque which may be cashed for an unknown amount at a future, and as yet
unknown date,” transforming “investor-state arbitration from a modified form of
commercial arbitration into a system to control the state’s exercise of regulatory
authority.”89 There is serious concern that general consent to permit a tribunal of
private individuals to decide investment claims undermines democratic principles.90
In addition, the lack of transparency and inability for interested parties to participate
have also been cited as major problems.91
3. Addressing Criticisms?
In light of these concerns, the recently concluded Transpacific Partnership
(TPP), a trade agreement that covers the United States and Pacific Rim countries,92
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the

87. See, e.g., Kate Miles, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Bringing the Public
Interest into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY, 295,
295 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010) (noting that the public interest is inherently
involved in investor-state disputes).
88. This is true for agreements since the 1990s. E.g., GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 24–26, 30 (2007); see also, e.g., TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.19. This
consent resulted in a substantial increase in claims. VAN HARTEN, supra, at 30.
89. Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the
International System of Investor Protection, 12 REV. INT ’ L POL. ECON. 600, 607–08 (2005) (quoting
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 21–22 (1999)).
90. E.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’ L L. 775, 779 (2008).
91. E.g., Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and Public
Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT ’ L & COMP. L. 337, 337 (2009); Valentina
S. Vadi, Trade Mark Protection, Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains & Paradoxes,
20 EUR. J. INT ’ L L. 773, 779–80 (2009) [hereinafter Vadi, Trade Mark Protection].
92. The TPP was concluded on October 5, 2015. Jackie Calmes, 11 Pacific Nations and
U.S. Endorse Giant Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, at A1. Countries signed the agreement on
February 4, 2016. E.g., Press Release, US Trade Representative, TPP Minister’s Statement (Feb. 4,
2016),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/February/TPPMinisters-Statement [https://perma.cc/7PDP-VLD7]; Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed in
Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600 [https://
perma.cc/H7WD-5TSV]. Of course, the status of the TPP is questionable since the recent
U.S. withdrawal from the agreement would seem to preclude possibility of ratification. See TPP,
supra note 40, art. 30.5 (requiring ratification by at least 6 countries that represent 85% of the TPP’s
combined GDP); see also Joshua Berlinger, TPP Unravels: Where the 11 Other Countries Go From Here,
CNN ( Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/asia/tpp-other-11-countries-what-next/
[https://perma.cc/2MGU-NLEV] (explaining that both the US and Japan need to ratify the agreement
for it to be effective).
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EU,93 as well as the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the United States and European Union (EU) have proposed some
changes to traditional investment claims. Although the TPP and TTIP may not be
ratified, they arestill relevant to consider as a comparison to older investment
agreements and whether its language addresses recognized problems.94 Under the
TPP and TTIP there are listed factors to consider for what constitutes indirect
expropriation.95 Although defenders claim this protects the domestic right to
regulate,96 the language still clearly contemplates that in some unspecified “rare”
instances, nondiscriminatory regulatory action that is designed to protect legitimate
public welfare, such as health, could be considered expropriation.97 Similarly, these
agreements attempt to cabin FET claims; for example, the TPP clarifies that
violation of a separate international agreement does not necessarily establish a
breach;98 however, even though alleged violation of a separate international
agreement, such as TRIPS, is not an automatic breach, there is nothing to preclude
a tribunal from considering this relevant.99 CETA, on the other hand, focuses
instead on denial of justice, such that violation of TRIPS should not alone be
considered a breach.100
Since 2015, the EU has introduced a major innovation to recent and pending
agreements. Notably, its proposal to the TTIP includes the first-ever appointed
investment tribunal court and an appellate body; in addition, it would prevent
arbitrators from also serving as lawyers in other investment cases.101 The initial
reaction to this proposal by the U.S. Trade Representative was fairly negative,102 and
93. CETA, supra note 15.
94. E.g., Kavaljit Singh, The TPP IS Dead. What Happens Next?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 7,
2016), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-tpp-is-dead-what-happens-next/5560781 [https://
perma.cc/24BH-UVTQ].
95. Both TPP and CETA list specific factors relevant to assessing indirect expropriation. TPP,
supra note 40, Annex 9-B, para. 3(a) (including character of government action, the extent to which it
interferes with distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of
the government action); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Ch. II, Annex I, arts. 2–3
(proposed July 31, 2015) [hereinafter TTIP], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/
september/tradoc_153807.pdf [https://perma.cc/S32C-CCUE] (character of government measure,
duration of the measure, and economic impact of measure are relevant). However, CETA does not
include comparable clarifications. See generally CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.12 (expropriation).
96. E.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPGRADING AND IMPROVING
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgradingand-Improving-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4NG-W2QB]
(“We would never negotiate away our right to do so, and we don’t ask other countries to do so either.”).
There is even some proposed language that aims to protect domestic regulation. E.g., TTIP, supra note
95, art. 2 (“The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of the Parties to regulate within their
territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives . . . .”).
97. E.g., TTIP, supra note 95, art. 3; TPP, supra note 40, Annex 9-B, para. 3(b).
98. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6(2)–(3); CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(2) (limited situations).
99. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6(3).
100. CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(2).
101. TTIP, supra note 95, arts. 9–11.
102. E.g., Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of EU Proposal for Investment
Court in Trade Pact, REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-
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it is especially unclear whether the TTIP will move forward under the current U.S.
administration.103 However, since announcing this, the EU added this same unique
process in the EU-Vietnam agreement, and even in CETA despite the fact that
CETA was officially concluded two years earlier.104 Moreover, as will be discussed,
even this significant proposal will not address the unique conflict investment claims
have with TRIPS flexibilities. Accordingly, although these proposals can be
considered an attempt to address previous criticisms, they ultimately fail to address
the conflict with TRIPS flexibilities that is the focus of this Article.
C. The Under-Recognized Current Conflict
The lack of recognition of the impending conflict is best appreciated in light
of two issues that will be explained in this Section. First, there are few who even
recognize the potential for the disciplines to overlap. Even when there is recognition
that IP issues could be central to investment claims, there is generally no
acknowledgement that IP norms could be threatened. Second, the defenders of the
present system have repeatedly asserted certain defenses that fail to recognize IP
conflicts. Since these defenses are so widely reported, they likely overshadow the
limited recognition of mere overlap.

ttip-idUSKCN0SN2LH20151029 [https://perma.cc/4HJM-8BBG]; see also BROMUND ET AL., The
U.S. Should Reject the European Commission’s Proposed Investment Court (Heritage Foundation Issue
Brief No. 4485, Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/the-us-shouldreject-the-european-commissions-proposed-investment-court [https://perma.cc/358T-MCKD].
103. E.g., Alex Lawson, Trump’s Election Puts TTIP In the Freezer: EU Trade Boss, LAW 360
( Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/884136/trump-s-election-puts-ttip-in-the-freezereu-trade-boss [https://perma.cc/GJS7-5KMQ]; Sean O’Grady, By Scrapping TPP and TTIP, Trump
Has Boosted American Jobs in the Short Term—and Destroyed Them in the Long Term, INDEP. ( Jan. 24,
2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-trade-deals-tpp-ttip-american-businessworkers-boost-short-term-destroy-long-term-a7543706.html [https://perma.cc/CWM5-XP2N];
Tereza Novotna, Will Donald Trump Shoot Down TIIP or Rebrand It as the Trump Trade and Investment
Partnership?, LSE U.S. CENTRE BLOG ( Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/
2017/01/19/will-donald-trump-shoot-down-ttip-or-rebrand-it-as-the-trump-trade-and-investmentpartnership/ [https://perma.cc/U5Q9-8DN5].
104. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 15; CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.27–28. Technically, the EU
was simply scrubbing the document, but it added substantial changes, including a permanent investment
tribunal, as well as an appellate tribunal. E.g., Stephen Drymer, CETA Under New Management: Why
is Trudeau Changing the Game?, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (May
12, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/ceta-under-new-management-why-trudeauchanging-game [https://perma.cc/887S-GRH8]; Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Legal
Scrubbing or Renegotiation? A Text-As-Data Analysis of How the EU Smuggled an Investment Court Into
Its Trade Agreement with Canada, THE PLOT (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theplot.org/2016/03/24/legal-scrubbing-or-renegotiation/ [https://perma.cc/YBS7-53KQ].
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1. Limited Recognition of Overlap, Let Alone Conflict
The first issue is the limited recognition of overlap by attorneys,105 scholars,
and policy makers.106 Of course, the Philip Morris and Eli Lilly investment cases
reflect corporate recognition of the overlap and although these cases are recent,
there is evidence that the tobacco industry was aware of the overlap two decades
ago.107 However, it is notable that despite widespread criticism of investment claims,
until recently there were relatively few that had noted the potential for IP to intersect
with investment agreements, let alone result in a collision of norms.108 For example,
105. In 2009, when a publication aimed at international investment attorneys published a special
issue on how intellectual property could be protected under investment agreements, it was noted that
the literature concerning this overlap was in its infancy. Markus Perkams & James
M. Hosking, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through International Investment Agreements:
Only a Romance or True Love?, TRANSNAT ’ L DISP. MGMT., Aug. 2009, at 2, 2 nn.6–7.
106. Although some public interest groups seem well aware of the threat to TRIPS flexibilities
based on informal discussions, they do not necessarily expressly mention TRIPS flexibilities in
documents aimed at the public at large. E.g., U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA Foreign
Investor Privileges Regime to Attack Canada’s Medicine Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Denial
of a Patent, PUB. CITIZEN ( Jan. 2013), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
PC-factsheet-on-Eli-Lilly-ISDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPW3-NWJX] (noting that, if successful, Eli
Lilly’s suit would permit corporate enforcement litigation of WTO rights even though corporations
have no such rights in at the WTO, although not focusing on threat to TRIPS flexibilities). However,
groups do note the issue in other situations. E.g., Ante Wessels, ISDS Threatens Privacy and Reform of
Copyright and Patent Law, FOUNDATION FOR A FREE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, Apr. 30,
2014, at 17, http://people.ffii.org/~ante/ISDS/FFII_NL_ISDS-threatens-privacy.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YF4W-K42F] (Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure comment to Dutch
Parliament noting that Canada’s “minor adjustment” to patent law prompted Eli Lilly’s $500 million
claim and that bigger reforms will “seriously endanger” a major overhaul of patent and copyright laws).
Similarly, representatives of Public Citizen, Health Gap, and MSF, together with other intellectual
property law professors, requested permission to file an amicus brief in the Eli Lilly
v. Canada case. Letter from Burcu Kilic, Legal & Policy Dir., Glob. Access to Meds. Program,
Pub. Citizen, & Brook K. Baker, Senior Policy Analyst, Healthgap, to Int’l Ctr. for Settlement
of Inv. Disputes (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw7111.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBV8-GHBZ]. But see Peter K. Yu, Investment Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, TEXAS A&M U. SCH. L. 2016, at 5–10 (arguing that there has long been an
overlap of IP and investment agreements and that the only new development is the actual initiation of
investor-state suits).
107. The tobacco industry actually first suggested that plain package legislation could result in
investment claims when Canada contemplated enacting legislation in 1994. E.g., Letter from RJR to
Standing Committee on Health, May 4, 1994, Memo from Carla Hill to RJR Reynolds and Philip Morris,
May 3, 1994, at 18, 21; Letter to Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, Mar. 25, 1994, at 5 (suggesting
violation of NAFTA’s investment chapter). In addition, it initiated an investor-state claim in 2001,
alleging expropriation, when Canada proposed bans of the terms “light” and “mild” on tobacco
products, although the case settled. The actual notice of arbitration is not publicly available, but there
is evidence that the case was filed. E.g., Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products Dispute,
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1282 [https://perma.cc/7G5T-9Z2K]; see also PHYSICIANS
FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, THE PLOT AGAINST P LAIN PACKAGING: HOW
MULTINATIONAL TOBACCO COMPANIES COLLUDED TO USE TRADE ARGUMENTS THEY KNEW
WERE PHONEY TO OPPOSE PLAIN PACKAGING 25–27 (2008), http://www.smokefree.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3WE-DCK4].
108. The 2015 debate between different groups of academics for and against investor-state
dispute settlement did not address this topic. See April 2015 Letter, supra note 62; March 2015 Letter,
supra note 83; see also Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 871–72 (noting that the lack of literature
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even though the Philip Morris case against Australia has prompted significant
attention, attention tends to focus on a general threat to regulatory, but not
intellectual property, sovereignty.109 In addition, although the Eli Lilly case against
Canada could have dramatically changed the notion of TRIPS flexibilities for
patents, this case received little attention from scholars as well as the popular media,
especially compared to the Philip Morris cases.110 Strikingly, the Declaration on
Patent Sovereignty drafted by prominent patent scholars does not acknowledge that
TRIPS flexibilities could quickly evaporate if challenged by an investor-state
dispute; rather, the underlying assumption would seem to be that these are not
threatened.111 Similarly, although the 2016 UN High Level Panel Report cited the
analyzing the use of investment claims to enforce intellectual property is “striking”). In light of Eli
Lilly’s dispute, Canada is obviously aware of this issue and did in fact seek to limit the scope of investorstate disputes in its trade agreement with the EU. E.g., Schewel, EU, Canada Fail to Close CETA;
Stuck Over Issue Related to Eli Lilly Case, Inside US Trade, Sept. 12, 2013. However, Canada did not
prevail. This seems to be changing, however. For example, a recent issue of the Journal of International
Economic Law contained a special issue on IP and international investment law. Henning Grosse RuseKhan, The Protection of Intellectual Property and International Investment Law, 19 J. INT ’L ECON. L.
(2016).
109. E.g., Lukasz Gruszczynski, Australian Plain Packaging Law, International Litigations and
Regulatory Chilling Effect, 2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 242 (2014); Deborah Sy, Warning: Investment Agreements
are Dangerous to Your Health, 43 GEO. WASH. INT ’L L. REV. 625 (2011); ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note
48.
110. There are only a few academic articles. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege:
Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH L.J. (2015); Okediji,
supra note 37; Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration
of IP Monopolies on Medicines–Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2015). Although there are some articles in the popular press concerning the
Eli Lilly case, they generally fail to recognize the implication for TRIPS flexibilities, and instead
focus on the fact that it represents an opportunity for corporations to utilize investor-state disputes.
E.g., BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ PC, The TPP Battle Begins,
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cca98a76-30fc-49bcb312-842ebb76e429 [https://perma.cc/YQ2J-BYWN] (mentioning the Eli Lilly dispute as
an example of a foreign company that can attack an adverse court or agency action, without
mention of TRIPS implication); MICHAEL GEIST, The Trouble With the TPP, Day 43: Eli Lilly is
What Happens When ISDS Rules Go Wrong (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2016/03/
the-trouble-with-the-tpp-day-43-eli-lilly-is-what-happens-when-isds-rules-go-wrong/
[https://
perma.cc/CR8B-WJXC] (no mention of TRIPS at all); Yiki Noguchi, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Provision on Trade Disputes Draws Criticism, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Oct. 27, 2015, 4:17
PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/28/452608600/trans-pacific-partnership-provision-on-tradedisputes-draws-criticism [https://perma.cc/G99K-GXAH] (mentioning the Eli Lilly investor-state
dispute as a way to get around domestic law, with no mention of TRIPS implications); Ed Silverman, Eli
Lilly v. Canada: The Patent War Moves to Washington, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 14, 2014, 4:00 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/04/14/eli-lilly-vs-canada-the-patent-war-movesto-washington/ [https://perma.cc/MC59-2ZQ7] (noting Eli Lilly alleges violation of TRIPS, but
focusing more on corporate efforts against Canada through investor-state arbitration and Special 301).
111. To be fair, the Declaration on Patent Sovereignty was drafted as part of a TRIPS
anniversary. However, one of the key drafters remarked at the Irvine symposium that he appreciated
learning about investor-state cases and thought they should be addressed in the next version of the
Declaration. This view is likely typical of IP policymakers since there are other recommendations
for countries to use TRIPS flexibilities since both the Philip Morris and Eli Lilly investment
cases were filed that do not acknowledge this issue. E.g., CHAN PARK ET AL., supra note 8. Indeed,
the 2016 discussion by the UN continues to recommend using TRIPS flexibilities. U.N. General
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Eli Lilly investment dispute in two footnotes,112 the Report overall does not
recognize how this dispute could have fundamentally compromised its overall
suggestion that states embrace more TRIPS flexibilities.113 Even those that realize
that investment disputes could impact TRIPS tend to focus on how TRIPS should
be interpreted to avoid conflict, without considering whether this is likely given past
practice of tribunals, such as the fact that decisions tend to favor investors and not
consistently rely on standard interpretive principles for international law.114
This is not entirely surprising since the investment and IP regimes not only
developed independently of one another, but did not seem to overlap until recently.
For example, although investment agreements have existed for decades, it was only
relatively recently that investment agreements consistently listed IP as a type of

Assembly, Human Rights Council, Access to Medicines in the Context of the Right of Everyone
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 32d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.23, ¶¶ 3–4 ( June 28, 2016) (calling upon states to implement
TRIPS flexibilities); see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights Council Suspends Thirty-Second Session After Adopting
33 Resolutions and One Decision ( July 1, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20226&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/XUG2-RAC9] (noting adoption
of proposal); Knowledge Ecology International, Human Rights Council Adopts Watershed Resolution on
Access to Medicines ( July 1, 2016), http://keionline.org/node/2605 [https://perma.cc/YZD5-V5QN].
112. UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 19 (citing Eli Lilly dispute as an example
of how trade agreements should not interfere with health policies, without clear recognition that it is
investment chapters of trade agreements that are problematic); Id. at 25 (citing Eli Lilly investment
dispute as an example of “undue political and economic pressure” against government action to protect
public health).
113. The initial charge of the panel did not formally include investor-state disputes. Id. at 3
(noting charge to review and assess proposals and recommend solutions regarding policy incoherence
among inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public health, but not mentioning
international investment laws). However, the report is nonetheless conscious of them. In particular, it
does note that for pending and future agreements including investment provisions, governments should
ensure that there are no provisions that “interfere” with the obligation to fulfill the right to health. Id.
at 28. However, this seems to fundamentally fail to realize the serious impact that many existing
agreements with investor provisions have on the realistic use of TRIPS flexibilities.
114. See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State
Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 52/2014, 2014) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual
Property Rights], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463711 [https://perma.cc/
SS8W-6TQU] (suggesting that only the exception to indirect expropriation requires TRIPS
interpretation); Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual Property
Law, 19 J. INT ’ L ECON. L. 121 (2016) (arguing that if tribunals properly apply Vienna convention, they
should reject Eli Lilly’s claims); Kathleen Liddell & Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and
Judicial Patent Decisions, J. INT ’ L ECON. L. (2016) (arguing that investment tribunals should defer to
domestic court decisions concerning patent laws and that investors have no legitimate expectation that
patent law will remain static over time, such that there should not be a FET breach); Ruse-Khan,
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 32 (assuming the only conflict is that a state elects not
to use TRIPS flexibility, rather than that TRIPS flexibilities may be directly challenged by investment
actions and concluding that pending investment claims are unlikely to succeed); Okediji, supra note 37,
at 1135–36 (noting that investment claims may be “in tension” with IP norms but suggesting that they
should be interpreted identically for parties to the WTO).

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

A COLLISION COURSE

419

investment explicitly covered.115 Similarly, although the WTO Dispute Settlement
Forum was designed to be the sole forum to adjudicate non-compliance of
agreement such as TRIPS,116 it is completely silent about investor-state suits.117
Considering that the potential for such suits existed decades before the WTO, this
suggests that in the early 1990s when the WTO was negotiated, there was no serious
contemplation of a conflict. This could partially be due to the fact that although
agreements existed, few cases were brought.118 Even in the years since the IP
investment claims have been brought, they are still not widely known or
understood.119
In addition, both the investment and IP arenas are fairly specialized with most
individuals in one not traditionally familiar with the other. For example, investment
agreements have traditionally focused on tangible assets, and although IP has been
considered a valuable asset for decades, it has long been considered a “highly
technical subject,” such that investment lawyers may not have focused on it.120
Similarly, IP lawyers recognize that IP is a commercial asset, but do not generally
focus on domestic or international commercial law, such that they do not focus on
investment law.
Of particular note, the few who see an overlap do not necessarily see, or focus
on, the impending conflict. To companies and those that support corporations, or
at least investment claims, the intersection of the two systems is generally viewed as

115. For example, NAFTA, which was concluded in the mid-1990s, did not include intellectual
property as a listed investment. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1139. Of course, explicitly listing
intellectual property is not required since the Eli Lilly case is in fact brought under NAFTA. However,
it is notable that this is the first IP case under NAFTA, even though companies could have asserted
such claims earlier, thus suggesting that the utility of investment claims for IP was not contemplated
earlier.
116. E.g., PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 161 (3d ed. 2013).
117. See generally DSU, supra note 4, art. 23 (noting that WTO members seeking redress of
violation of WTO agreements, such as TRIPS, should comply with the DSU and not make their own
determinations).
118. Before TRIPS was concluded in 1994, there were only a few known cases filed, but since
its conclusion, cases have increased exponentially. See Van Harten, Public Statement, supra note 72.
119. For example, after I wrote a 2015 blog post on the Eli Lilly case and the potential for
impacting TRIPS flexibilities, I received a number of emails from attorneys and academics who were
previously unaware of the issue. See Cynthia M. Ho, Million Dollar Mistake? The Cost of Limiting or
Canceling IP Rights, PATENTLYO (Mar. 29, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/millionlimiting-canceling.html [https://perma.cc/7SSB-E2R3].
120. E.g., Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics, supra note 33, at 27.
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a positive,121 with little concern for interference with the WTO system.122 Some
scholars who initially recognized the overlap may not have seriously considered this
possibility,123 or assumed that an investment tribunal would necessarily apply WTO
norms to avoid a conflict.124 One scholar of international economic law recognized
that investment tribunals could interpret TRIPS provisions, but seemed to assume
that arbitrators will apply TRIPS norms even when investment agreements do not
have any language to support such an approach.125 A few early scholars who initially
recognized a potential problem for TRIPS flexibilities mentioned it in passing
without actual discussion of the depth of the problem, or how to address it.126
121. E.g., Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International
Investment Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights?, in YEARBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009–10 397, 423 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010)
(noting that investment claims provide benefits to companies over the WTO context); Peter
B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International
Arbitration, 13 N.C.J. L. & TECH. ONLINE 149, 152 (2012) (suggesting that arbitration could be
used to address compulsory licenses); Baiju S. Vasani et. al, Treaty Protection for Global Patents:
A Response to a Growing Problem for Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies, JONES
DAY (Oct. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/treaty_protection/ [https://perma.cc/6TSV-K4C9]
(suggesting that alleged violation of TRIPS standards could be challenged through investment
agreements and that this is preferable to the WTO system for pharmaceutical patents “under assault”
in the developing world).
122. For example, Gibson’s article notes the competing legal regimes but solely from the
perspective of what an investor will prefer. He acknowledges that some suggest this is a radical
departure from the WTO system but quickly dismisses this. In particular, he argues that each system
has distinct claims and that the WTO rules could be relevant “context” for the investment claims, such
that there is not necessarily a conflict. See Gibson, supra note 121, at 465–72. However, one scholar with
familiarity of not only investment claims, but also the WTO system has expressed concern. See
Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 899–00 (noting that it would be “dangerous” for an investment
tribunal to interpret TRIPS given the limited record of tribunals attempting to interpret WTO law).
123. E.g., Lahra Liberti, International Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An
Overview 13 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working Paper No. 2010/1, 2010),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2010_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4WHR-P2ZT] (stating “one might wonder whether the ‘fair and equitable’ standard can be invoked in
order to challenge national IPR laws consistent with the TRIPS agreement” without further exploring
the possibility).
124. E.g., Carlos M. Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards
for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?, GRAIN (Aug. 2004), https://www.grain.org/
article/entries/125-bilateral-investment-agreements-agents-of-new-global-standards-for-the-protectionof-intellectual-property-rights [https://perma.cc/6L4S-34EW] (suggesting that the WTO principle of
differentiation versus discrimination is relevant to FET and also that the NAFTA exception for
compulsory licenses should provide protection against indirect expropriation claims).
125. See Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics, supra note 33 at 179–81; see also Vadi, Trade Mark
Protection, supra note 91, at 796–800 (arguing that investment tribunals do consider prior arbitral awards
as well as the other international courts).
126. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Investment Agreements: A New Threat to Health and TRIPS
Flexibilities?, BILATERALS.ORG ( June 27, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investment-agreements-anew-threat [https://perma.cc/3R56-8QLY] (stating that “systemic implications” of the Eli Lilly case
for TRIPS flexibilities are very significant and that countries should be circumspect about signing more
international agreements without providing other solutions); Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 914
(lacking any details on the danger or how to address it despite noting potential danger); van Aaken,
Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 11, at 115–17 (noting accurately that although the Doha
Public Health Declaration considers relevant human rights law, there is no equivalent found in
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This may be changing. In 2014, one essay recognized that Eli Lilly’s claim
could have major implications for TRIPS flexibilities and although primarily arguing
that the claims should be rejected, briefly considered possible reforms.127 A 2016
article recognized that FET claims could impact TRIPS flexibilities and argued that
there should be great deference to judicial decisions, such as Canada’s interpretation
of the patentability requirement of utility.128 Similarly, another article argued that
tribunals should either have no jurisdiction to hear disputes that implicate TRIPS,
or at least follow Vienna Convention rules to interpret TRIPS to avoid conflicts.129
However, it remains unclear whether a tribunal of commercial lawyers will accept
these arguments given not only a narrow view of intellectual property rights that do
not consider public policy, but also a general trend towards viewing intellectual
property as solely an asset divorced from its policy foundations.130 Moreover, even
the limited recognition of overlap between IP and investment agreements is far
overshadowed by prominent defenses that dominate in both academic and
mainstream discussions discussed in the next section.
2. Prominent Defenses of Investor-State Disputes Do Not Recognize Conflict
An important issue is that those who most robustly and frequently defend
investor-state disputes fail to recognize any overlap, and their defenses do not
address the pending collision course. Granted, some of these defenses could reflect
mere rhetoric or positions that have since changed—especially since some recently
concluded agreements or proposed agreements could arguably address some
conflict with domestic regulatory space. However, even though drafters of recent
agreements may recognize the need to modify investment disputes going forward,
proposals thus far do not entirely eliminate TRIPS conflicts, as discussed in Part II.
Moreover, they do not address conflicts under the majority of existing agreements.
Accordingly, this Section focuses on three defenses that are often articulated in
support of investment claims and its dispute system.131 This Section begins with
sovereignty concerns. Then, the Section addresses the arguments that investment
claims promote foreign direct investment and economically benefit the host
country. Finally, the argument that investment-state disputes provide a fair process
will be addressed. As will be explained, each of the “defenses” is questionable and
even if generally true, inadequately addresses current and forthcoming IP conflicts.

investment law, but only focusing on the TRIPS conflict for compulsory licensing). See generally
VANHONNAEKER, supra note 33 (noting that investment claims can be read coherently with TRIPS by
giving TRIPS priority, without noting that this is unlikely).
127. Okediji, supra note 37.
128. See Liddell & Waibel, supra note 114, passim.
129. Frankel, supra note 114, at 1132–38.
130. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT ’ L L. 557 (2015); Yu, supra
note 106.
131. Although there are other defenses raised, these seem most relevant to the IP collision clash
and how the defenses are not applicable.
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a. ISDS Promotes Sovereignty Concerns and Regulatory Chill Are Overstated
A central defense of investment claims that has great relevance to TRIPS
flexibilities focuses on domestic sovereignty. There are two aspects to the
sovereignty defense that will be addressed in this Section. First, defenders of
investment claims assert that the ISDS system in fact promotes sovereignty and the
rule of law—in direct opposition to the concern raised by critics that domestic
regulatory authority is unduly impeded. Second, even when defenders acknowledge
that the system might limit traditional domestic sovereignty, they either raise
irrelevant issues or claim these concerns are overstated. As this Section will explain,
neither of these related defenses of ISDS are well supported and, even if accurate,
would fail to address the problem with TRIPS flexibilities.
Some defenders of investment claims assert that agreements promote the rule
of law by ensuring that U.S.-like legal protections exist in other countries as well.
For example, the USTR has alleged that investment rules are designed to provide
“no greater substantive rights to foreign investors than are afforded under the
Constitution and U.S. law.”132 Similarly, a number of international law scholars have
argued that these agreements provide rights similar to the U.S. Constitution.133
Although there are similarities, the problem is that the investment claims actually
go beyond domestic law, but without the usual democratic accountability. As
explained earlier, investment tribunals often interpret claims more expansively than
U.S. law. In addition, although never mentioned by defenders of investment claims,
the rule of law typically requires clear rules that are equally enforced and independently
adjudicated.134 Investment claims seem to lack these fundamental qualities since the
investment “rules” giving rise to claims generally only apply to states, not investors,
are inherently unclear, and adjudicated by private individuals with no job security.
Even when defenders of investment claims attempt to address concerns about
domestic sovereignty, they tend to raise issues that do not actually address domestic
sovereignty, as will be explained.135 For example, some allege that states often
win,136 that the United States has never “lost” a case,137 or that most challenged
actions are not legislative.138 However, these facts do not mean that there is no
132. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48.
133. April 2015 Letter, supra note 62, at 1 (alleging rights similar to those guaranteed in the
Constitution).
134. E.g., Cutler, supra note 72, at 92–93.
135. Some even suggest that international agreements are intended to limit domestic action in
exchange for some benefit. E.g., Schwebel, supra note 79, at 1–2.
136. E.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62 (claiming that states win more often than investors).
137. E.g., ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48 (“Despite having 50 ISDS agreements in place, the
United States has never lost a case and nothing in our agreements has inhibited our response.”).
138. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR-STATE-DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 92–93 (2014) (noting
mostly administrative decisions impacting single investors); Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which
Host Country Government Actors are Most Involved in Disputes with Foreign Investors (Columbia FDI
Perspectives, Paper No. 120, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-120-Caddel-andJensen-FINAL-WEBSITE-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKN4-9QLQ].
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impact on domestic decision making; roughly a third of filed investment claims
result in settlements that typically favor investors and intrude on domestic
sovereignty.139 In addition, domestic sovereignty includes far more than legislative
activity; permitting private corporations to second-guess executive or even judicial
decisions still raises concerns. The United States has also attempted to defend
investment claims as consistent with regulatory autonomy because its agreements
do not permit tribunals to overturn U.S. law and instead can only award monetary
compensation.140 Although this is technically true,141 it does not actually address
how nations are constrained: some international agreements permit investment
tribunals to order injunctive relief that could in fact overturn domestic laws.142
Limiting remedies to “only” monetary compensation is of little solace to countries
when remedies can be tens or hundreds of millions of dollars and the average
defense of even a successful suit costs almost $5 million,143 but has been up to $40
million to simply assess jurisdiction.144 Given that the average loss is a significant
sum of $16.6 million,145 with awards as high as $50 billion,146 a state may consider
legitimate action to be too much of a gamble. This is of particular concern for
developing countries that have been ordered to pay hundreds of millions or even
over a billion dollars in damages.147
139. E.g., UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 1.
140. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48.
141. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art. 34; TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.28.
142. For example, one tribunal ordered Ecuador to halt enforcement of an Ecuadorian
appellate ruling that had previously ordered Chevron to pay for its contamination even before a final
panel decision. E.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim
Award on Interim Measures (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0173.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKT3-JRYS]; Ian Laird et al.,
International Investment Law and Arbitration: 2012 in Review, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2012–2013, at 203 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2014); see also Ankita
Ritwik, Tobacco Packaging Arbitration and the State’s Ability to Legislate, 54 HARV. INT ’ L L.J. 523, 528–
32 (2013) (noting that Philip Morris’ attempt to enjoin Australia’s plain package law would be broader
than most injunctive relief previously ordered by tribunals). Of course, even though not all agreements
would permit injunctive relief, this possibility still poses a threat under some agreements.
143. E.g., Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL
ARBITRATION REVIEW (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/
Counting_the_costs_of_investment_treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLE6-66TJ].
144. E.g., OECD, GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentpolicy/ISDSprogressreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/28YG-UUQL].
145. E.g., Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Demystifying Investment Treaty Arbitration 4
(2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
146. See Glen Moody, Corporate Sovereignty Tribunal Makes $50 Billion Award Against Russia,
TECHDIRT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140801/
05242228082/corporate-sovereignty-tribunal-makes-50-billion-award-against-russia.shtml [https://
perma.cc/JAX6-8VMV].
147. E.g., Pia Eberhardt, Investment Protection at a Crossroads: The TTIP and the Future of
International Investment Law, 2014 FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG INT’L POL’ Y ANALYSIS 7 (noting
2012 award of $2.4 billion against Ecuador that is about three percent of the country’s GDP and
roughly equal to its annual health budget); see also Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure
Legal System That Lets Corporations Sue Countries, THE GUARDIAN ( June 10, 2015, 1:00 AM),
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Even when defenders of investment claims actually recognize that traditional
domestic decisions could be impacted by investment claims, they argue that there is
no cause for concern. These defenses focus on a few different issues. First, some
assert that “bona fide” government acts will not result in liability.148 However, what
one nation considers “bona fide” may not be to an investor; otherwise, there would
be no outpouring of concern regarding investment claims. In addition, although
most defenders of investment claims seem to recognize that the challenges to
tobacco packaging laws are challenges to domestic sovereignty, they have asserted
that because these cases are not “representative” of investment claims in general,
there is no actual threat to sovereignty.149
Defenders of investment claims tend to assume that there are no sovereignty
concerns because of supposed lack of evidence of a chilling effect.150 For example,
the United States claims this is true because of an alleged increase in public interest
regulation after investment agreements.151 However, it does not mean that
governments have not been hesitant to enact more regulation because of the
existence of investment claims. Although it can be difficult to fully catalog chilling
effects where there are likely nonpublic negotiations, there are nonetheless some
examples.152 Countries have limited enforcement of environmental laws due to
actual or threatened investment claims.153 In addition, countries have been hesitant
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-suestates-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/YHR9-ENC4] (noting substantial awards against Ecuador and El
Salvador).
148. See, e.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62, at 2 (“[B]ona fide government acts will pass
muster.”); ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48. One article makes a similar claim based on a selective case
study of published environmental decisions; by focusing solely on environmental decisions, it
completely omitted discussion of the pending Philip Morris case. See The Honorable Charles
N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why It
Need Not, and Must Not Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’ L L. 689, 689–99 (2014).
Moreover, even focusing just in the environmental area, there now seems to be a contrary decision
in which one of the arbitrators himself noted that the majority decision was an “intrusion into
the environmental policy of the state.” Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Canada, Dissenting Opinion of
Professor Donald McRae, Case N0. 2009-04, ¶ 49 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4213.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5LS4ZWH].
149. E.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62.
150. Along somewhat similar lines, some scholars have suggested that domestic regulatory
concerns are not supported based on an empirical evaluation of renegotiated and terminated investment
agreements, although their evaluation notably excludes the most recent time period when such issues
have been hotly contested. Tomer Broude et al., Legitimation Through Negotiation: Do States Seek More
Regulatory Space In their BITs?, HEBREW U. OF JERUSALEM (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845297 [https://perma.cc/ED6Y-MVUQ].
151. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48.
152. Some commentators have noted that investors have used the ability to sue in ISDS as a
lobbying tool, but that it is difficult to assess the full impact of the threat to sue since there may be no
documented public record. Van Harten, Flawed Proposals, supra note 75, at 9–10; Poulsen, supra note
67, at 29–31.
153. For example, Indonesia has withdrawn a prior regulation on mining and granted an
exception to one particular investor. Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human
Rights Enforcement and Realization, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73,
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to enact plain package tobacco laws due to the threat of investor-state arbitration.154
Well-developed countries are not immune either. For example, Canada has a history
of acting cautiously in light of threat of suit for a range of regulatory activities, with
one official asserting that many regulations “never saw the light of day.”155 In
addition, Paraguay failed to enforce its own laws, citing a potential expropriation
claim under an agreement with Germany, including one instance where the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights found Paraguay’s lack of action to violate human
rights.156
The arguments made in defense of investment claims as not unduly impinging
on domestic sovereignty are particularly inapplicable to the conflict with TRIPS.
The intersection of investment claims with IP involves not only domestic
sovereignty, but the sanctity of an entirely separate international agreement and
process. Even if the goal of every international agreement is to constrain domestic
sovereignty, it is generally not a goal to constrain other international agreements.157
There are a number of interpretive principles in international law that aim to
minimize conflict between agreements by interpreting them to avoid

100 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2006); Ilge, supra note 16, at 11. Also, Peru has declined to enforce its
environmental regulations against Renco even though the company had agreed to comply with the
regulations when Renco bought its metal smelter, and Peru had already granted multiple extensions
to comply. E.g., Renco Uses U.S.-Peru FTA to Evade Justice for La Oroya Pollution, PUB. CITIZEN
(Dec. 2012), https://www.citizen.org/documents/renco-la-oroya-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U5KD-3SBA]; Lori Wallach, Brewing Storm Over ISDR Clouds: Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks—Part
II, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 14, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/01/
14/brewing-storm-over-isdr-clouds-trans-pacific-partnership-talks-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5CG4B7GN]; see also Provost & Kennard, supra note 84 (regarding Guatemala’s decision not to challenge
mining company Goldcorp for fear that it would result in an investment claim despite domestic protests
and a recommendation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). But see TIETJE ET
AL., supra note 138, at 43–48 (suggesting that investor claims alone should not be considered the sole
reason for domestic actions, and fear of domestic court actions, which can enjoin laws, may sometimes
be more significant).
154. E.g., Muchangi, supra note 81; Tavernise, supra note 81.
155. William Greider, The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20 th Century, NATION
(Nov. 17, 2001), http://www.thenation.com/article/right-and-us-trade-law-invalidating-20th-century/
[https://perma.cc/9F7B-G983] (quoting former Canadian government official); see also Letter from
Elizabeth May, Member of Parliament for Saanich-Gulf Islands to Trade Agreements and NAFTA
Secretariat ( Jan. 29, 2013), http://elizabethmaymp.ca/submission-environmental-assessment-tpp
[https://perma.cc/Q8EZ-37A4] (noting that as a result of investment cases,
the Canadian government has failed to regulate or ban toxic substances it would have
before investment suits were permissible); Barrie McKenna, Ottawa Could Face Lawsuits for Strict
Corruption Rules, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/reporton-business/international-business/ottawa-could-face-lawsuits-for-strict-trade-corruption-rulesreport/article21739211/ [https://perma.cc/2LZW-7GFZ] (Canadian Council of Chief Executive
warning that new anti-corruption rules could prompt investor-state action if Canada proceeded.) In
addition, New Zealand has delayed proceeding with plain packaging of tobacco.
156. E.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 248 (Mar. 29, 2006); Ilge, supra note 16, at 12.
157. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, In Defense of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31
ARB. INT ’ L 181, 189 (2015) (noting that states can “specify their rights to regulate within their borders”
without any mention of attempting to modify other international agreements).
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inconsistency.158 However, these principles are of little help here. The conflict
between investment agreements and TRIPS is unusual in that there is technically
not a direct conflict with respect to whether nations can comply with both
agreements, but there could be a conflict with how each system interprets TRIPS,
as well as a conflict with the TRIPS flexibilities.
b. Investment Claims Promote Investment and Economic Development
Another common defense is that investment agreements are beneficial to
countries in promoting foreign direct investment as well as economic development
more generally.159 As noted earlier, such agreements originally were intended to
promote these goals.160 However, how well they serve that function today, and
whether any such benefits offset current concerns with broad interpretations that
impact sovereignty, is a major issue.
Defenders of the ISDS process contend that it promotes foreign direct
investment (FDI) and economic development, such that it outweighs potential
impingement on domestic discretion. For example, the Business and Industry
Advisory Committee to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) considers the ISDS process “indispensable” to protect
investments and promote FDI,161 while the Center for Strategic and International
Studies contends that such agreements facilitate economic growth and job
creation.162 In fact, ISDS defenders often point to surveys indicating that some
companies consider ISDS valuable,163 and to certain studies that suggest a
correlation between investment agreements and FDI.164 Yet, these studies only find
a weak correlation between ISDS and FDI.165 In addition, correlation is not

158. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 332 cmt. f (A.L.I. 1987)
(“[A]greements should be interpreted to avoid inconsistency if fairly possible. Agreements may not in
fact be incompatible if the earlier can be given effect as regards a limited subject matter while the later
agreement may be interpreted to govern other matters within its general scope.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D
Treaties § 21 (2016) (“To the fullest extent possible, the language of a treaty is to be interpreted so as
to avoid inconsistency.”).
159. E.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 148, at 701–09.
160. See supra Part I.B.1.
161. Business & Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD [BIAC], Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: An Indispensable Element of Investment Protection, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. 4 (2015).
162. Scott Miller & Gregory Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 3 (2015), http://csis.org/publication/investor-state-dispute-settlement
[https://perma.cc/59ZS-4KWS].
163. E.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 148, at 704–05.
164. E.g., id. at 706–08; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Impact of
International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of Empirical Studies
1998-2014, at 4 [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI Overview] (Working Paper, Sept. 2014),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/unctad-web-diae-pcb-2014-Sep%2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YHG-ZQ9C].
165. E.g., Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation
Versus Causation (Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 2255, 2007), https://mpra.ub.uni-
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causation. For example, the correlation could reflect that countries that already had
strong FDI sign agreements.166 In addition, other studies find little or no effect on
FDI,167 or that investment claims are only relevant to some investors or some
industries.168 Thus, the evidence is quite mixed.169 Some countries seem to recognize
that any theoretical benefits are far outweighed by potential financial liability as well
as sovereignty concerns. Specifically, countries have taken action to terminate
investment agreements of which they were signatories or have indicated a lack of
support for existing or potential agreements that permit investor-state suits.170
Even if there were a strong correlation between the existence of an investment
agreement and improved economic outcomes, such an argument is tenuous and
mirrors a similar fallacy in the IP context. In the IP context, there are those who
argue that, since stronger IP rights correlate with foreign direct investment, stronger
IP rights should be encouraged.171 However, both arguments ignore the
fundamental fact in any statistical analysis that correlation does not establish
causation. In either context, there are always a wealth of factors that impact whether
a foreign company will invest in any given country;172 this is something the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recently
underscored in noting that investment agreements play a complementary role
muenchen.de/2255/1/MPRA_paper_2255.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U4U-4V8Z] (finding lack of
strong correlation between investment treaties and investment flows and noting that evidence is mixed).
166. UNCTAD, FDI Overview, supra note 164, at 5.
167. Id. at 5–6; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT ’L L. 397 (2011) (suggesting no
meaningful correlation).
168. Roderick Abbott et al., Demystifying Investor-State Dispute Settlement ( I SDS), (ECIPE
Occasional Paper No. 5/2014, 2014).
169. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (providing differing views on this issue); Todd Allee & Clint
Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment,
65 INT ’L ORG. 401 (2011) (noting that foreign direct investment only increases in countries where there
are no investment claims).
170. E.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment Policy Making
in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities of Treaty Renewal, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/
DIAE/PCB/2013/9 ( June 2013); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Denunciation of the
ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact on Investor-State Claims, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/
DIAE/IA/2010/6 (Dec. 2010).
171. E.g., Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual
Property Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 241, 248–49 (1998); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT ’ L L. 621, 638 n.163 (1998) (stating that “[i]n general, strong intellectual
property protection is correlated with the attraction of foreign direct investment.”).
172. Studies indicate other factors such as tax incentives, infrastructure, and skill are more
relevant. E.g., Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’ L L. 163 (1998); Claudio R. Frischtak,
Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68, 103–05 (Wallerstein et
al. eds., 1993); Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign
Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 181–85 (1996).
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among a number of determinants and that there are many data limitations.173 Thus,
not every causative relationship has been (and perhaps never will be) explored and
exhausted, and in fact, there are strong counter-examples in both the investment
and IP contexts. For example, Brazil enjoys strong foreign direct investment despite
the fact that it thus far has not agreed to investor-state arbitration.174 Similarly, Brazil
and India enjoy strong foreign investments even though their IP laws have been
noted as inadequate.175
The claim that investment agreements are beneficial in promoting investment
seems particularly unsupported in the IP context. After all, “investment” in creating
IP is different from tangible investments such as real property that were traditionally
envisioned by such agreements. Whereas tangible investments clearly benefit the
host states, stronger IP more likely benefits the foreign private company, but results
in higher prices in the host state.176 Importantly, even if investment agreements
theoretically promoted investment, that does not address the conflict with IP
flexibility under TRIPS. Moreover, the pending conflict is particularly problematic
given that investment claims that impact TRIPS are considered in a process that
lacks the type of protections available in the WTO, even though defenders of the
system assert the system is fair.177

173. UNCTAD, FDI Overview, supra note 164, at 4, 6, 8.
174. E.g., Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The Brazilian Agreement on
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment
Agreements?, INT’ L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/
itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-newformula-for-international-investment-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/BSV7-TEYY]; see also Pedro
Martini, Brazil’s New Investment Treaties: Outside Looking . . . Out?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG ( June 16,
2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/06/16/brazils-new-investment-treaties-outsidelooking-out-2/ [https://perma.cc/Z8PC-6Q7Q].
175. For example, India had $1 billion in foreign direct investment in three months in 2013
despite controversial patent laws. India Receives Highest FDI Worth $1 Billion in Pharma in April-June,
ECON. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-0901/news/41663407_1_pharmaceuticals-sector-highest-fdi-fdi-policy [https://perma.cc/BB8X-LS6E].
Similarly, Brazil and Thailand received substantial investment in the 1970s and 1980s
despite relatively low levels of protection. Compare Edwin Mansfield, Int’l Fin. Corp, Intellectual Property
Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer 10 (1994), http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/888591468739296453/pdf/multi-page.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/HUU8-ZX8Q] (discussing perceived weak intellectual property protections in Brazil and
Thailand), with Lawrence Bouton & Mariusz Sumlinski, Int’l Fin. Corp., Trends in Private Investment in
Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970–1998, at 8 (Working Paper No. 41, 2000),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13986/multi0page.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/4ZVG-TU4D] (providing comprehensive statistics of private
investment in Brazil and Thailand).
176. For example, when an investor purchases a plant, that usually involves hiring local
employees, thus benefitting the host country. By contrast, when an investor has IP in a host country,
such as a patent or a trademark, there may be little actual investment in the host country besides
purchasing advertising. Moreover, IP is known to raise costs.
177. For example, there is an appellate body at the WTO. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17.
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c. Investor-State Disputes as a Fair Process with Procedural Protection
The final major defense of investment claims is that they should not pose any
serious concern since the process has procedural protections.178 Defenders suggest
that investment proceedings mimic traditional U.S. litigation where there is legal
representation with multiple rounds of briefs and hearings, as well as the right to
review and even annul awards.179 However, once again, the opportunity to “review”
awards is typically based on narrow grounds with no appellate review. Also, the
multiple rounds of briefs and hearings need not be publicly disclosed and interested
parties may not be able to participate in direct contravention of U.S. litigation.180
Moreover, although defenders have asserted that there is no concern about
arbitrator bias since there is process to challenge bias, arbitrators in the current
system inherently lack independence of an actual judiciary with procedural
protections.181
Most importantly, this purported defense is irrelevant to investment claims
premised on IP issues that arguably violate TRIPS. There is already a fair and
independent process to address such issues before the WTO.182 Unlike the situation
with investor-arbitration claims, there is no criticism of WTO adjudication as being
partial; in fact, a recent study suggests that the WTO system of adjudication results
in better results than the traditional investor-state disputes before private arbitrators
appointed by parties.183 In addition, although investment claims were created to
178. See e.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62.
179. Id.
180. In response to criticisms, transparency has increased. For example, The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ratified rules to promote transparency for
treaties using UNCITRAL arbitration after 2014. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/68/17 (2013).
However, these rules do not automatically apply to more than 3000 existing agreements. To this end,
the UN General Assembly ratified the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration to allow parties that entered into agreements before 2014 to more easily opt into these rules.
See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/69/496 (2014). But, parties that entered
into agreements after 2014 can opt out of the default transparency. See id. at art. 1; see also
LISE JOHNSON & NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, NEW UNCITRAL ARBITRATION
RULES ON TRANSPARENCY: APPLICATION, CONTENT AND NEXT STEPS 26 (2013), http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRAL_Rules_on_Transparency_commentary_FINAL1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FX7S-JNPQ].
181. See March 2015 Letter, supra note 83.
182. The stability of the WTO process is underscored by the recent proposal for
an investment court and appellate body based on the WTO system. See Commission Concept Paper
on Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform 9 (May 5, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF [https://perma.cc/SZF4CVUW]; see also Joost Pauwelyn, Why the US Should Support the EU Proposal for an “Investment Court
System,” LINKEDIN (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-us-should-support-euproposal-investment-court-system-pauwelyn?forceNoSplash=true
[https://perma.cc/
65BL-RXML].
183. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment
Arbitrators are from Mars and Trade Adjudicators are from Venus (Oct. 1, 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549050 (discussing the differences between WTO and
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avoid domestic volatility and gunboat diplomacy,184 given the lack of any investment
cases involving IP until recent years, the “need” for investment claims to protect IP
seems particularly unfounded.
Recently concluded or proposed agreements that aim to improve procedural
protections still fail to adequately address TRIPS conflicts. For example, even recent
agreements with a more independent initial investment tribunal and appellate review
still fail to address the conflicts with TRIPS norms. In particular, while these
measures might promote independence, they do not ensure TRIPS norms will be
safeguarded. In addition, although both the TPP and EU proposal for the TTIP
aim to prevent forum shopping,185 they would not completely address a conflict
with TRIPS. The EU proposes to bar investment claims that have already been
submitted to another international tribunal, but only if it is concerning the “same
treatment.”186 Since investment claims provide different relief than TRIPS, this may
be inadequate to prevent simultaneous adjudication in the WTO and investment
arenas. Moreover, even if “same treatment” were interpreted to be simply same
fundamental facts, the EU Proposal would not prevent a WTO case being litigated
after the investment one and resulting in conflicting interpretations of TRIPS. The
TPP does require investors to waive the right to initiate or proceed with another
dispute settlement procedure regarding the same issue.187 So, this would
theoretically prevent a subsequent WTO panel coming to a conflicting
interpretation of TRIPS. However, this does nothing to stop a tribunal from
interpreting TRIPS provisions in the first instance, let alone inconsistently with
prior WTO decisions and/or accepted norms, even if not embodied in an actual
WTO panel decision. CETA also aims to address conflicts by noting that an
investment tribunal shall stay its proceedings, but again does not address possible
TRIPS issues. After all, it only requires the investment tribunal to stay its
proceedings where there is potential for overlapping compensation—which is never
the goal of a WTO claim, or another international claim that could have a significant
impact on the investment dispute.188 This provision would still not have stopped
the Eli Lilly dispute where there is no parallel proceeding in the WTO and does
nothing to prevent inconsistency with WTO norms.

ICSID adjudicators as the basis in fact for disparate outcomes between WTO and ICSID adjudication
systems).
184. See supra Part I.B.1.
185. E.g., European Commission Press Release IP/15/5651, Commission Proposes New
Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations
(Sept 16, 2015); European Commission: Fact Sheet on Investment Protection in the TTIP,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.5%20Inv%20Prot%20and%20I
SDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/M28J-ZJ75].
186. See TTIP, supra note 95, art. 14, ¶¶ 2–3.
187. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.20(2)(b).
188. CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.24.
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II. THE CURRENT COLLISION COURSE
This Part aims to explain how investor-state disputes based on IP issues
governed by other agreements raise unique conflicts that are not adequately
recognized. This Part begins by discussing the first investor-state cases involving
alleged violations of TRIPS. Then, this Part provides an overview of potential
situations in which investor-state cases could present serious challenges to TRIPS
flexibilities.
A. Initial Investment Cases Challenging TRIPS
This Section addresses the first investment cases that directly challenge
intellectual property norms under TRIPS. Notably, these cases involve not only
TRIPS patent rights, but also trademark rights. Although the Declaration of Patent
Sovereignty focuses on patents, domestic discretion that may impinge on
trademarks is consistent with the idea of TRIPS flexibilities. As this Section explains,
although a direct collision of TRIPS flexibilities has thus far been averted with
regard to domestic regulations on tobacco that impact trademark rights, a future
collision is possible. Although Part III discusses how to minimize collisions and
recognizes that some recent agreements have promising language to do so, these
initial cases are likely more representative of likely collisions under the vast majority
of investment agreements that lack the new language.
1. Philip Morris
Philip Morris189 brought investment disputes regarding tobacco regulation
against Uruguay190 and Australia.191 Although both countries have regulated
tobacco for decades, they have also been on the forefront of implementing the 2003
World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.192 The
189. For the purposes of this section, any reference to the multinational company Philip Morris
includes all related entities in the case.
190. P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1.
191. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1.
192. WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION (WHO) (2003) [hereinafter WHO FCTC]. See generally Josef Ostransky,
Tobacco Investment Disputes—Public Policy, Fragmentation of International Law and Echoes of
the Calvo Doctrine, 3 CZECH Y.B. INT ’ L L. 161, 164–65 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164726 (noting that Uruguay and Australia are pioneers at combatting
tobacco consumption and Uruguay was one of the first countries to ratify the FCTC). In addition,
some have suggested that Philip Morris intentionally chose Uruguay because it is a country with
reasonable damages, yet limited resources, to defend against an investment claim. See Todd Weiler,
Philip Morris v. Uruguay: An Analysis of Tobacco Control Measures in the Context of International
Investment Law 17 nn. 54, 36 (Physicians for a Smoke-Free Can., Report #1, 2010),
http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/2010/pmivsuruguay/opinion-pmi-uruguay.pdf [https://
perma.cc/34HS-JXXL] (noting that while the market in Mauritius was too small for damages to be
worthwhile, the market in Mexico was larger and established enough to better respond to investment
claims such that Uruguay is chosen to “make an example”). Notably, Philip Morris is seeking
$25 million in damages against Uruguay, a country that has a domestic GDP that is roughly half
of Philip Morris’ annual revenue. See Duff Wilson, Cigarette Giants in Global Fight on Tighter Rules,
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Framework Convention does not expressly require any bars to trademarks, although
the guidelines for implementation do suggest limiting trademarks.193 These
investment disputes were brought after failed attempts to enjoin the laws
domestically.194
a. Factual Context
Although both Uruguay and Australia regulated tobacco packaging in a
manner that impacted trademark rights, their regulations differed. Uruguay’s
regulations were less onerous on trademark rights; it only required that each brand
have a single variation and required health warnings on 80% of the package.195
Australia, on the other hand, required cigarettes to be packaged in “drab dark
brown” and severely restricted the use of trademarks to essentially just the brand
name with no trademarked logos.196 In both cases, Philip Morris claimed that its
trademarks were expropriated and that it was denied fair and equitable treatment,
with the FET claim based in part on alleged failure to comply with international
obligations, under TRIPS and the Paris Convention.197 The TRIPS claims were
contrary to the views of most academics, as well as the World Intellectual Property

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at A1; Jim Armitage, Big Tobacco Puts Companies on Trial, INDEPENDENT,
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/bigtobacco-puts-countries-on-trial-as-concerns-over-ttip-deals-mount-9807478.html
[https://perma.cc/2B8S-QGHU].
193. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Elaboration of Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 13 of the Convention, ¶¶ 15, 16, FCTC/COP/3/9 (Sept. 2, 2008); WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Elaboration of Guidelines for Implementation of Article 11
of the Convention, ¶ 46, FCTC/COP/3/7 (Aug. 21, 2008); WHO FCTC, supra note 192.
194. See, e.g., British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v Commonwealth, Order, [2012] HCA 43, ¶
3 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2012/HCA/43 [https://perma.cc/56CAKE3S] (entering judgment on behalf of Australia that its tobacco packaging law did not deprive
company investment); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth, Order, [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 3 (Austl.),
http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2012/HCA/43
[https://perma.cc/BS8Z-K66C]
(entering judgment on behalf of Australia that its tobacco packaging law did not deprive company
investment); P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 30–31. Technically, Philip Morris
was the intervener in the Australia case. See British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd v Commonwealth, Philip
Morris Ltd’s Submissions (Intervening ) , (2011) HCA 43, ¶ 2, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/
assets/cases/s389-2012/BAT_Phillip.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BKH-NPRJ] (entering as an
intervener).
195. Uruguay only mandated that each brand of tobacco products has a single presentation to
prohibit labeling cigarettes as “light” or “ultralight” and required health warnings on 80% of the
package. P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 24–25.
196. See Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ss 19 20 (Austl.). This law prohibits trademarks
from appearing on the package other than as permitted in Article 20(3), which only allows the brand
name for the tobacco products. See id. s 20.
197. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6.6–6.12 (alleging Australia’s
breach of international agreements), ¶ 7.2(a)–(b) (alleging P.M.’s deprivation of investment in Australia),
¶ 7.7 (referring to violation of international law for FET claim); P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration,
supra note 1, para 85. While Philip Morris also made other allegations, only these claims have been
highlighted to allow for comparison with the Eli Lilly case.
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Office.198
After the 2011 investment claim against Australia was initiated, Ukraine, likely
acting in conjunction with Philip Morris, initiated a WTO dispute against Australia
regarding the same plain package tobacco laws that allegedly violate TRIPS.199
Other countries, including Indonesia, Cuba, Honduras, and the Dominican
Republic subsequently joined the consultation, and the WTO set up a panel to hear
a consolidated case.200 This was a high profile WTO case with many third party
observers that seemed on a direct collision course with an investment tribunal
interpretation of the same TRIPS provisions.201
A complete collision is presently averted since the Australian tribunal
dismissed the investment case on jurisdictional grounds202 and a majority of the
Uruguay tribunal found in favor of Uruguay.203 The Australian tribunal agreed to
198. E.g., PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, supra note 107, at 16–19 (WIPO
Comments); Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests, and Justifiability:
Art 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, AM. U. INT ’ L L. REV. 505 (2014); see also infra notes
234, 241 and accompanying text (providing views of additional academics on proper interpretation of
TRIPS article 15 and article 20). But see Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the
Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ’ L L. 1149 (2013). Intellectual Property
attorneys, however, were more sympathetic. E.g., Carmela R. Zocco, Plain Packaging: A Growing Threat
to Trademark Rights, LES NOUVELLES, June 2013, at 140, 141 (noting that numerous intellectual
property rights groups have condemned plain packaging as an “unjustified attack” on rights); Stephen
Stern & Olivia Draudins, Generic Packaging: A Bridge (Over the Bodies of IP Rights) Too Far?, AUSTL.
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 146, 149 (2011) (arguing that TRIPS article 20 bars total ban on trademark use
even if not explicitly stated).
199. Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO
Doc. WT/DS434/1 (March 15, 2012). Indeed, Philip Morris is financing legal costs of two countries
in the WTO challenge. E.g., Stephanie Nebehay, Australia Says Big Tobacco Aiding WTO Challenges,
REUTERS (May 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/us-trade-tobaccoidUSBRE84M0IO20120523 [https://perma.cc/VV4K-2JAM]; Myron Levin, As Nations Try to Snuff
Out Smoking, Cigarette Makers Use Trade Treaties to Fire UP Legal Challenges, FAIR WARNING (Nov.
29, 2012), http://www.fairwarning.org/2012/11/as-nations-try-to-snuff-out-smoking-cigarettemakers-use-trade-treaties-to-fire-up-legal-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/4VHL-834R].
200. Dispute Settlement, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO
Doc. WT/DS458/16 (May 5, 2014); see also Brief: Panel Appointed for WTO Mega-Case on Australia
Tobacco
Packaging, IP-WATCH (May 6, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/
06/panel-appointed-for-wto-mega-case-on-australia-tobacco-packaging/ [https://perma.cc/5J7XL5QR].
201. E.g, Dispute Settlement, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and
Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Other Packaging, WTO
Doc. WT/DS434/13 (May 5, 2014) [hereinafter WTO, Australia Dispute Settlement].
202. P.M. v. Austl., Award, supra note 75; see also Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric
Peterson, Australia Prevails in Arbitration with Philip Morris over Tobacco Plain Packaging Dispute,
INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevailsin-arbitration-with-philip-morris-over-tobacco-plain-packaging-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/6HLAC7JT]. However, the tobacco industry could easily bring another dispute since it has aggressively
fought tobacco restrictions. E.g., Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT ’ L
L.J. 384 (2016).
203. Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award ( July 8, 2016) [hereinafter P.M.
v. Uru., Award].
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dismiss the Philip Morris claim after finding that the company had improperly
restructured itself to become a “foreign” corporation after Australia announced its
plans to enact plain packaging, such that there was no jurisdiction.204 However, the
tribunal’s failure to address Australia’s other challenge to jurisdiction leaves open an
important question for future collisions. In particular, Australia had argued that the
investment tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide any issues under TRIPS given the
existence of a separate dispute settlement mechanism for such claims with which
the investment tribunal ruling could potentially conflict.205 Uruguay did not raise
this issue, even though it was facing an alleged violation of TRIPS and challenged
jurisdiction on other grounds.206 Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether
collisions in the future can be averted based on the defense that there is no
jurisdiction at all.
Although the WTO panel is reported to have ruled in favor of Australia on
the plain package case as this article goes to press, the panel report is not expected
until July and investment claims against countries that enact similar packaging rules
are possible.207 Countries have shown clear interest in such laws and some have
been enacting them even before the conclusion of the investment cases, let alone
the WTO panel ruling.208 At the same time, the tobacco industry continues to
vigorously contest such regulation.209 Immediately after the conclusion of the

204. Id. ¶¶ 460, 584; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth, Australia’s Response to Notice
of Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2012-12, ¶¶ 29–32 (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 21 2011)
[hereinafter Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration].
205. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 33–35.
206. See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter P.M. v. Uru., Decision on
Jurisdiction]; P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 86 (asserting violation of unstated
provisions of TRIPS).
207. E.g., Tobacco Industry Suffers Defeat as WTO Upholds Australia's Plain Packaging Laws
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2017/may/05/australias-defeatswto-challenge-to-plain-packaging-of-tobacco.
208. Countries that have already enacted plain packaging laws so far include UK, Ireland, and
France. Children and Families Act 2014, c. 6 (Eng.); Public Health (Standardized Packaging of
Tobacco) Bill 2014 (Bill No. 54/2014) (Ir.); Ordonnance no..2016-623 du 19 mai 2016 portant
transposition de la directive 2014/40/UE sur la fabrication, la présentation et la vente des produits du
tabac et des produits connexes [Ordinance No 2016-623 of May 19, 2016 transposing Directive
2014/40/EU on the manufacture, presentation, and sale of tobacco and related products],
Journal Officiel de la République Francaise [ J.O] [Official Gazette of France], May 20, 2016.
In addition, other countries are considering such laws. E.g., Canadian Cancer Society,
Plain Packaging—International Overview, ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (May 19, 2016),
http://ash.org.uk/information-and-resources/packaging-labelling-information-and-resources/
standardised-plain-packaging/plain-packaging-an-international-overview/
[https://perma.cc/
4VXC-FDQB]; World Health Organization [WHO], World No Tobacco Day 2016: Get Ready for Plain
Packaging (May 31, 2016), http://www.who.int/campaigns/no-tobacco-day/2016/event/en/
[https://perma.cc/PX9C-FMW9].
209. For example, Britain’s recent plain package laws have been challenged in British courts.
E.g., David Jolly, Tobacco Giants Sue Britain over Plain Packaging, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/business/international/tobacco-plain-packaging-philipmorris-british-american-cigarettes.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TJ5A-VCTX].
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Uruguay case, Philip Morris issued a press statement that it was not a party to any
investment disputes and that it would use “thoughtful diplomacy,” that suggests it
will not assert investment claims—but could still threaten to do so.210 Countries
faced with such a threat should realize that although Uruguay prevailed, it was not
a unanimous opinion and future tribunals need not follow the majority opinion.
Also, even if no future investment claims are actually asserted based on plain
packaging, examining how a conflict was narrowly avoided is helpful to not only
show the inherent conflict between the IP and investment regimes, but also to show
why the Eli Lilly case posed a much more serious, yet not well understood threat
to TRIPS flexibility.
b. Investment Claims
This Section evaluates the extent to which tobacco regulation, such as plain
package tobacco laws, might result in liability for expropriation and then FET
claims. Although plain package tobacco laws such as Australia’s are recommended
by the WHO, there was no decision on the merits in that case. As noted below,
although the expropriation claim failed against Uruguay, another case might not find
similarly. Moreover, even though a majority of the tribunal in Uruguay agreed that
there was no FET claim, the lack of a consensus indicates vulnerability to FET
claims. Although it is of course possible for an investment tribunal to read other
international agreements harmoniously, as some have suggested,211 that does not
mean that there is no vulnerability—especially given structural elements of
investment agreements and how they are adjudicated that tilt more towards interests
of investors, rather than public health.212
i. Vulnerability to Expropriation Claims
Philip Morris alleged that domestic laws limiting the use of some trademarks
constitute an expropriation of its investments in trademarks.213 Essentially, it
210. Philip Morris International Comments on Tribunal’s Decision in Arbitration Between
PMI and Uruguay, BUS. WIRE ( July 8, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20160708005828/en/Philip-Morris-International-Comments-Tribunal%E2%80%99s-DecisionArbitration [https://perma.cc/3S4Z-PABA].
211. E.g., Harold Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights Imperative, 57
HARV. L. REV. 433, 444 (2016) (arguing that since the Tobacco Convention was later in time and more
specific, it should prevail under rules of treaty interpretation in the context of how a WTO panel should
rule, although the same principle should apply to an investment dispute).
212. Not only do most investment agreements aside from the newest agreements not have
balancing language concerning other policies beyond promoting investments, but they are also
interpreted by a small group of primarily commercial arbitrators that would seem likely to be more
sympathetic to commercial interests, especially since there are a number of arbitrators that also act as
counsel or party experts in other cases. E.g., Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT ’ L
L. 46 (2016); David Graukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping
Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 44
(2012) (majority of arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases whereas only ten
percent of arbitrators have acted as counsel for states in other cases).
213. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1 ¶¶ 7.3-7.5; P.M. v. Uru., Request for
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asserted that the regulations create “substantial interference” with use of its
trademarks and significant losses, such that its trademarks were expropriated.214
Importantly, although the Australian court previously rejected a similar claim under
domestic law, that does not preclude an expropriation claim which is often
interpreted more broadly.215 In some cases, tribunals have found expropriation to
exist if there is substantial interference with the investment, regardless of whether
there is a strong policy ground.216
Although the Uruguay tribunal rejected Philip Morris’s assertion that there is
inadequate justification for its tobacco regulations and found no expropriation
consistent with some recent decisions, another investment dispute against a country
for tobacco regulation could have a different outcome.217 Uruguay was fortunate to
not only have financial support to battle Philip Morris’s claim,218 but a tribunal that
was willing to accept and actually rely on supportive amicus submissions.219 Neither
of these factors is typical of most investment cases. Indeed, commentators have
noted that Philip Morris brought its investment claim against Uruguay to threaten
other countries and likely was not anticipating that Uruguay would receive financial
support to defend itself.220
The details of the Uruguay tribunal finding, even if not binding on future
tribunals, are of interest. Most notably with regard to TRIPS collisions, the tribunal
concluded that there is no absolute right to use trademarks pursuant to TRIPS
Article 20.221 Even though this is consistent with many academic commentators and
the WHO position, this does not guarantee a similar finding in a future case—
especially since not all commentators agree with this position. In addition, the
tribunal found that the Uruguay regulation mandating that trademarks be limited to
twenty percent of the packages was not an expropriation since it did not limit how
the trademarks were used.222 However, in plain package regulation, such as

Arbitration, supra note 1, at ¶ 82.
214. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.3; see also P.M. v. Uru., Request for
Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 48, 82 (arguing that regulations deprived trademarks of commercial value
and that mandatory discontinuation of trademarks constituted expropriation).
215. See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 50.
216. E.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, supra note 71; see also Newcomb, The
Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005).
217. E.g., Ursula Kriebaum, Expropriation, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 38–41
(Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015).
218. E.g., Tobacco Industry Targets Uruguay’s Gold Standard Anti-Tobacco Laws, MIKE
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.mikebloomberg.com/news/tobacco-industry-targetsuruguays-gold-standard-anti-tobacco-laws/ [https://perma.cc/U6UX-BAFP] (indicating intent to
support Uruguay government).
219. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶¶ 38, 43.
220. E.g., Tavernise, supra note 81 (noting that Uruguay would have had to settle if the
Bloomberg Foundation had not intervened to provide financial support).
221. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 262 (“[N]owhere does the TRIPS
Agreement . . . provide for a right to use.”); see also id. ¶ 269 (noting “no absolute right to use”
trademarks, especially for an industry that is often subject to regulation).
222. Id. ¶ 276.
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Australia’s, the use of trademarks are in fact limited when a company is barred from
using logos at all. Accordingly, a country that adopts plain package regulations is
still vulnerable to losing an expropriation claim even if a future tribunal were to
follow the majority of the Uruguay tribunal’s reasoning. In addition, although the
tribunal rejected the expropriation claim against Uruguay that limited companies to
one brand variant within a family, this is not typical of most tobacco regulations,
such that it is likely not directly applicable to other regulations.223 However, the
tribunal did characterize this regulation of tobacco as within police power of a
nation, such that there would be no compensable expropriation, even if there were
economic injury.224 In particular, the tribunal noted that the regulations were
consistent with Uruguay’s domestic obligation under the Constitution to legislate in
the interest of public health, as well as comply with the FCTC, and the regulation
was proportionate to the intended objective, citing the amicus briefs of the WHO
and PAHO.225 Thus, even though Uruguay’s law is not typical of most plain package
laws, the rationale in support of Uruguay’s law would seem helpful to countries with
plain package tobacco laws if a future tribunal agrees. However, not only does a
tribunal not need to follow this reasoning, but countries could still be hesitant to
enact domestic regulation to avoid an investment dispute.226
ii. FET Claims Can Prevail Against Tobacco Regulation
FET claims regarding plain package tobacco laws are even more problematic
than expropriation claims with regard to TRIPS flexibilities. In particular, a country
could have TRIPS-consistent laws according to a WTO panel, yet nonetheless be
liable for millions of dollars if an investment tribunal is sympathetic to the claim
that FET can be based on a “legitimate expectation” of TRIPS compliance that is
consistent with corporate interpretation of TRIPS.227 Although Philip Morris made
this claim in its dispute against Australia, there was no decision on the merits since
that dispute was dismissed. In the Uruguay case, Philip Morris did argue a legitimate
expectation—but only that the laws would remain stable, and not based on TRIPS
compliance. So, even though a majority of the Uruguay tribunal ruled in favor of
Uruguay, there is still no decision on whether a company has a legitimate
expectation of TRIPS compliance. The Uruguay tribunal suggested that legitimate
expectations should be based on specific representations.228 However, other

223. In addition, the tribunal found inadequate expropriation based on evaluating the business
as a whole which did not suffer losses. Id. ¶¶ 283–84.
224. Id. ¶¶ 291–307.
225. Id. ¶¶ 301–06.
226. Id. (noting countries that have declined to enact plain package tobacco laws for fear of
investment suits).
227. Although one tribunal has stated that companies should not have a legitimate expectation
that tobacco regulations remain static, not only need subsequent tribunals not follow that, but also it
would have no impact on a FET claim premised solely on alleged TRIPS violation. See Grand River
Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2011).
228. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 376.

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

438

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 6:395

tribunals have sometimes found violations of FET claims without specific
representations to an investor, or implied commitments from general legislation or
government statements to the public.229 Although some have suggested that
tribunals may be inclined to require a specific representation in recent cases, a
tribunal need not follow this approach and this is particularly true since many FET
claims are asserted under agreements that have limited guidance concerning FET
claims.230 Divergent interpretations of identical trademark articles of TRIPS seem
likely not only because investment tribunals are not bound to follow WTO law, but
because of different views on how key TRIPS provisions should be interpreted, as
discussed below.
While a full analysis of the many TRIPS provisions cited is beyond the scope
of this Article given other issues, a brief overview should be adequate to underscore
the likelihood of conflicting rulings with the WTO case, or at least a challenge to
TRIPS norms.231 There are two TRIPS articles for which there are vastly different
interpretations. One open issue is whether a nation would implicitly violate TRIPS
Article 15 concerning obstacles to registration if it permitted registration, but barred
use of the mark.232 The second contested issue is whether plain packaging
requirements violate TRIPS Article 20 that bars trademarks from being
“unjustifiably encumbered” by special requirements. Although the Uruguay tribunal
interpreted TRIPS Article 20 in a manner favorable to countries desirous of tobacco
regulation, other panels need not follow the decision and, as explained below, it is
possible that they may not.
Although TRIPS Article 15 is about registration, there is a substantial dispute
concerning whether the owner of a trademark has an affirmative right to use with a
registered trademark. Philip Morris and a number of other attorneys have asserted
that plain package regulations inherently violate TRIPS Article 15.4 which bars
obstacles to registration based on the nature of goods to which a trademark is
applied since registration includes an implicit right to use.233 The argument is
229. E.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic
of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 277 (May 12, 2005); Enron Corporation and
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, Award, ¶ 264 (May 22,
2007); National Grid plc v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 176–79 (Nov. 3, 2008).
230. E.g., Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role
of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. INT ’ L
DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 38 (2012).
231. Others have also noted that views on whether plain package measures comply with TRIPS
“vary greatly.” E.g., Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 900.
232. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 15.4 (“nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to
be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of a trademark”).
233. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.11; e.g., Julius L. Katz & Richard
G. Dearden, Plain Packaging & International Trade Treaties, in PLAIN PACKAGING & INTERNATIONAL
TRADE TREATIES 111 ( J.C. Luik ed., 1998); Carmela Rotundo Zocco, Plain Packaging: A Growing
Threat to Trademark Rights, LES NOUVELLES 140 (2013); Stephen Stern & Olivia Draudins, Generic
Packaging—A Bridge (Over the Bodies of IP Rights) Too Far?, AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 146
(2011).

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

2016]

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

A COLLISION COURSE

439

premised on the fact that plain packaging targets only tobacco products. However,
a number of scholars contest this position and note that there is no TRIPS provision
that permits an affirmative right to use.234 This is also buttressed by a prior WTO
panel decision, as well as traditional trademark law that does not consider
trademarks to provide an affirmative right to use.235 Nonetheless, two scholars
suggest that the “spirit” of the provision at least makes this a close case.236
Considering that tribunals sometimes broadly interpret claims in favor of investors
and generally lack any knowledge of intellectual property law as commercial lawyers,
it seems that an investment tribunal could find this provision violated. That said,
although this provision was not at issue in the Uruguay case, the Uruguay reasoning
concerning Article 20 suggests that it is also possible, although not guaranteed, for
a tribunal to interpret this to bar an affirmative right to use.
Another contested issue is the TRIPS article that permits trademarks to be
regulated, but not unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as use in a
manner that would negatively impact its ability to distinguish the goods or services
of one from another.237 According to Philip Morris, plain packaging clearly
encumbers its trademarks since it is barred from using logos and also restricted in
the size of trademarks on the package, such that its product cannot be distinguished
from others except as to price.238
There are two different issues with this TRIPS provision. Some claim that it
does not apply to a law that would completely bar a use.239 However, others argue
that it is illogical and inconsistent with treaty interpretation norms to interpret this
provision as prohibiting some encumbrances, but not complete bans.240 In addition,
even assuming that plain packaging is a “special form” to which Article 20 applies,
Australia as well as many others assert that the rules are justified.241 After all, plain
234. E.g., Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests and
Justifiability: Art 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, 29 AM. U. INT ’ L L. REV. 505 (2014);
Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademark: The Case of Tobacco, 3 W. TRADE REV. 53 (2004); Alberto
Alemanno & Enrico Bonadio, Do You Mind My Smoking? Plain Packaging of Cigarettes Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 450 (2011); Mercurio, Awakening, supra
note 55; see also TRIPS, supra note 6 (only providing a right to exclude third parties, but not a right to
use).
235. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, at ¶ 7.611, WTO Doc WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15,
2005) (in discussing Article 24.5 of TRIPS, where it provides that certain measures “shall not
prejudice . . . the right to use a trademark”); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.).
236. E.g., Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, supra note 198; see also Annette Kur, The Right to Use
One’s Own Trade Mark: A Self-Evident Issue, EIPR (1996) (supporting argument that trademarks have
a right to use, although not regarding the Philip Morris case in particular); PATRICK BASHAM ET AL.,
ERASING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PLAIN PACKAGING FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK RIGHTS (2011).
237. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 20.
238. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.8.
239. E.g., McGrady, supra note 235, at 62–63.
240. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 198, at 1172.
241. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 33–35, 46, 49; Davison
& Emerton, supra note 235; McGrady, supra note 234; Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note 234, at 463–
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package tobacco laws such as Australia’s have been endorsed by both the WHO
and the Convention Secretariat of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control.242 There are also studies that suggest such laws will reduce smoking
rates.243 Not surprisingly, critics of plain package tobacco disagree;244 they also
assert that such laws are not the least restrictive means, and the laws will increase
illicit trade in tobacco products.245 The Uruguay tribunal did not engage in all of
these issues since it found that Article 20 simply did not provide an affirmative right
to use a trademark. However, it is unclear whether another tribunal would agree.
2. Eli Lilly
Eli Lilly has initiated the first investor-state claim that specifically threatens
patent flexibilities under TRIPS.246 Similar to Philip Morris, Eli Lilly only initiated
an investment claim after exhausting its domestic recourse. Eli Lilly began with a

66; Andrew Mitchell & David Studdert, Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products in Australia: A Novel
Regulation Faces Legal Challenge, 307 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 261 (2012).
242. World Health Organization [WHO], Submission of the World Health Organization Re:
Australia Plain Packaging Legislation ( June 2011); World Health Organization [WHO] Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, Submission by the Convention Secretariat in Respect of Australia’s Draft
Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 ( June 6, 2011).
243. E.g., Rachel Pechey et al., Impact of Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products on Smoking in
Adults and Children: An Elicitation of International Experts’ Estimates, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1 (2013);
Melanie Wakefield et al., Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic
Health Warnings 1 Year After Implementation: Results from a National Cross-Sectional Tracking Survey,
24 TOBACCO CONTROL ii17 (2015).
244. E.g., P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.4 (Philip Morris claims there is
no credible evidence that plain packaging will reduce smoking prevalence or that it will increase
effectiveness of health warning); Researchers Find No Evidence Plain Packaging “Experiment” Will
Cut Smoking, PHILIP MORRIS INT ’ L , http://www.pmi.com/eng/media_center/Pages/plain_
packaging_experiment.aspx [https://perma.cc/FYF6-3DHT] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). But see Sarah
Bosley, If Plain Packaging Does not Deter Smoking, Why Was Industry Against It, GUARDIAN, ( Jan. 22,
2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jan/22/plain-packaging-not-detersmokers-big-tobacco [https://perma.cc/7CMP-XSGL] (noting that Philip Morris has funded studies
to prove its point and that if it actually believed there was no impact, it would not so aggressively argue
against plain packaging).
245. There is also disagreement on whether plain packaging might result in an increase in illicit
trade in tobacco products. E.g., K. A. Evans-Reeves et al., It Will Harm Business and Increase
Illicit Trade: An Evaluation of the Relevance, Quality and Transparency of Evidence Submitted
by Transnational Tobacco Companies to the UK Consultation on Standardized Packaging 2012,
TOBACCO CONTROL (Dec. 3, 2014), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/11/28/
tobaccocontrol-2014-051930 [https://perma.cc/KU7X-LHX3] (finding evidence submitted to
UK by tobacco companies not persuasive since all information was not independent); Philip
Morris Ltd., Response to UK Consultation on Standardised Packaging, PHILIP MORRIS INT ’ L (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/submissions/Documents/UK%20-%20%20
Standardised%20Packaging%20Submission%20PML.pdf [https://perma.cc/D244-KJZJ].
246. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA Foreign Investor
Privileges Regime to Attack Canada’s Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Invalidation of a Patent
(2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/eli-lilly-investor-state-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
APK9-95UP]; Carlos M. Correa, Investment Agreements: A New Threat to the TRIPS Flexibilities,
SOUTH CENTRE (May 13, 2013), http://www.southcentre.int/question/investment-agreements-anew-threat-to-the-trips-flexibilities/ [https://perma.cc/Y23Y-GFLE].
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notice of intent to arbitrate in November 7, 2012.247 The actual notice of arbitration
was filed on September 12, 2013 and included claims for expropriation as well as
breach of minimum standards of treatment, including fair and equitable
treatment.248
a. Factual Context
The investment claims are premised on judicial invalidation of Eli Lilly patents
for two commercially successful drugs sold under the names Strattera and Zyprexa
for failing to meet the “promise doctrine,” a judicial interpretation of the core patent
requirement of utility.249 This doctrine only applies when a patent applicant, such as
Eli Lilly, “promises” that an invention will have a particular purpose.250 An
application satisfies the promise doctrine if it discloses data to support the
promise.251 Eli Lilly had to make such promises because it had already received at
least one full term of patent protection for the basic chemical compound underlying
each drug and was seeking additional protection after earlier patents expired.252 The
invalidated patent on Strattera was found to fail to satisfy its promise of treating
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) as a chronic condition because
it failed to include any data to establish that it would be efficacious for long-term
use.253 The invalidated patent on Zyprexa was also found to promise a superior
treatment for long term treatment of psychosis without supporting data.254
Although Eli Lilly has complained that Canada’s law is unique and
unprecedented,255 a number of scholars note that other countries effectively require
patent applications to make the same showing, but simply under a different, yet
universally recognized patent standard, such as whether its description is
adequate.256 In addition, it is consistent with longstanding and universally
247. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1172.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN67-L92V].
248. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, ¶ 76 (Can.).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada Statement of
Defence ¶ 53 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 30, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw3253.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5F2-D2W4] [hereinafter Canada
Statement of Defence].
253. See Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. [2010] F.C. 915 (Can. Ont.).
254. See Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011] F.C. 1288, ¶ 218 (Can. Ont.).
255. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 96, 98, 107.
256. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of
Timothy R. Holbrook, ( Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4137.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ8T-P3F7]; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2, Second Expert Report of Timothy Holbrook, (Dec. 5, 2015) http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G3N9-J7F5]; Dimtry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C.L. REV. 949; Gold
& Shortt, supra note 25, at 53–57, 61–77; id. But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case
No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to File A Non-Disputing Party Amicus Curiae Submission By
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recognized patent policy to mandate disclosure of something valuable to justify the
social cost of a patent, such as higher prices during the term of the patent.257
Canada’s promise doctrine can be considered a type of TRIPS flexibility. The
basic notion of TRIPS flexibilities is that countries can provide their own
interpretation of key patentability requirements that are undefined to limit patents
to truly deserving inventions and promote access to lower cost drugs.258 Although
proponents of these flexibilities typically suggest interpreting the terms “invention”
or “new,” any core patentability requirement that is undefined in TRIPS can provide
flexibility.259 So, although atypical among most countries, Canada’s promise
doctrine interpreting the requirement of “useful” is a type of TRIPS flexibility.
Canada’s promise doctrine addresses a key issue in the pharmaceutical industry
that is of particular concern to those who advocate using TRIPS flexibilities. In
particular, the industry has a practice of sequentially patenting minor modifications
or different uses of a drug after first obtaining a patent on the basic chemical
compound in an attempt to maximize revenue.260 The industry considers this
appropriate “life cycle management.”261 However, public health advocates, as well

Intellectual Property Law Professors, (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw7107.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NXW-5WZB] (opposing view by
seven law professors). However, as explained by Canada, the opposing view of these law professors is
not supported. See Government of Canada Observations on Issues Raised in Amicus Submissions, Case
No. UNCT/14/2, April 22, 2016.
257. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519. 535–36 (1966) (“[A] patent is not a hunting
license.”); Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, ¶ 70 (Can.).
258. See, e.g., WIPO, Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, Patent Related
Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the National
and Regional Levels, CDIP/5/4 Rev., at 10–11 (Aug. 18, 2010); GERMÁN VELÁSQUEZ,
SOUTH CENTRE, GUIDELINES ON PATENTABILITY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2015),
http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RP61_Guidelines-on-Patentability-andA2M_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXJ9-HXJA]; SERGEY KONDRATYUK ET AL., EAST EUROPE &
CENTRAL ASIA UNION OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIPS PUBLIC
HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN BELARUS, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA
AND UKRAINE 15–17 (2013), http://ecuo.org/media/filer_public/2013/12/26/analytical_report_
ecuo_trips_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8WV-TH56].
259. Indeed, some have suggested that any of the patentability requirements can be interpreted
to promote flexibility, although not specifically suggesting a provision similar to Canada’s.
E.g. SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION
AND PUB. HEALTH, THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 34 (2005), http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHP5-MGAL]; UNCTADICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 358–361 (2005); Carlos Correa, Guidelines
for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective 3–4 (World Health
Organization [WHO et al., Working Paper 2006).
260. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT
“EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2009); Roger Collier,
Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, 185 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. E385 (2013); Rebecca
S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’ Y 379 (2007).
261. See, e.g., TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE
MANAGEMENT: MAKING THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND (2012); Vandana Prajapati et al.,
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as some governments including not only India, but also the EU, consider this to be
an inappropriate way of “evergreening” patent profits.262 Eli Lilly’s patents illustrate
how Canada’s promise doctrine addresses this problem. Both of the invalidated
patents were attempts to obtain additional patent protection after the original patent
on the underlying chemical compound had expired. Moreover, Eli Lilly did not even
make any modifications to the compound, but instead simply attempted to claim
that it had a new use without any basis for that claim.263
b. Investment Claims
The Eli Lilly case will apparently not result in a complete collision between
investment claims and TRIPS since the tribunal just ruled unanimously in favor of
Canada.264 However, analyzing the details of the case, including the potential harm
of investment claims to TRIPS norms is important since this decision is not binding
on any future investment tribunal. In addition, even though Canada ultimately
prevailed, including recoupment of some costs, the fact that Canada still had to
engage in multi-year litigation and nonetheless pay some costs, with the risk of
losing millions could be enough to have a chilling effect on the use of TRIPS
flexibilities.265 This is especially true for developing countries that have fewer
resources than Canada. Accordingly, this Section will explain Eli Lilly’s arguments
and how the expropriation and FET claims could have a major chilling effect on
TRIPS in a subsequent case, even though they were rejected here. In analyzing the
potential impact on TRIPS flexibilities, it should be noted that although Eli Lilly’s
claim were not based solely on breach of TRIPS, some investment claims were
premised on breach of NAFTA provisions that are identical to TRIPS.266
Before discussing the specific investment claims at issue, it may be relevant to
consider some specifics of the tribunal decision. Unlike the Uruguay decision, which
had discrete sections on expropriation versus FET claims, the tribunal considered
a number of issues as necessary pre-requisites before considering the details of the

Product Lifecycle Management Through Patents and Regulatory Strategies, 13 J. MED. MARKETING 171
(2013).
262. E.g., Novartis Ag v. Union Of India & Ors., (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India); TONY HARRIS
ET. AL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT, at x (2013), https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/
sites/g/files/net856/f/2013-05-27_ppr_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2WP-YC42]; Nathalie
Vernaz et al., Patented Drug Extension Strategies on Health Care Spending: A Cost-Evaluation Analysis,
10 PLOS MED. 1 (2013); Commission Preliminary Report on Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, (Nov. 28,
2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4K23-X6N7].
263. See, e.g., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 252, ¶ 4.
264. Eli Lilly v. Canada, Final Award, Mar. 16, 2017 [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Award].
265. See id. ¶ 480 (requiring Canada to pay twenty-five percent of its legal costs).
266. Eli Lilly has also claimed that Canada is in breach of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. See
Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 45. However, this does not directly address TRIPS
flexibilities and is also substantively incorrect. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 110, at 241–42.
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investment claims.267 For example, the tribunal first rejected Canada’s argument that
judicial decisions were immune from the pending investment claims unless there
was a denial of justice. The tribunal also addressed two factual questions as essential
predicates to Eli Lilly’s investment claims. In particular, the tribunal evaluated
whether (a) there was a dramatic change in Canada’s utility requirement, as well as
(b) whether the utility requirement as applied to Eli Lilly’s patents were arbitrary
and/or discriminatory.268 Since the tribunal found Eli Lilly failed to establish that
either of these factual predicates existed, it did not need to assess the details of the
expropriation and FET claims. Accordingly, many of the most concerning threats
to TRIPS flexibilities in this case have been temporarily avoided. Indeed, PhARMA,
the lobbying group for pharmaceutical companies issued a press release expressing
disappointment that the ruling failed to address whether Canada’s law complied
with NAFTA, and, by implication, TRIPS.269 So, in other words, PhARMA was
hoping that the dispute would in fact limit existing TRIPS flexibilities. Although
that has not come to pass, the underlying facts can still be used to explain how
TRIPS flexibilities may be systematically threatened in another case.
i. Expropriation
Eli Lilly made two claims for expropriation: (1) that the patents were directly
expropriated (because the rights were taken away), and/or (2) that the patents were
indirectly expropriated (because the judicial invalidations destroyed the value of the
patents).270 Eli Lilly also alleged that although there is a specific exclusion from
expropriation for intellectual property rights that are revoked, this does not apply
because the patent rights were revoked inconsistently with NAFTA patent
requirements.271 This Section will focus on how the expropriation claims could have
potentially challenged TRIPS flexibilities.272 After all, even though the tribunal ruled
in favor of Canada, a subsequent tribunal would not be bound to this decision. In
addition, even the positive ruling for Canada does not mean that there is no threat
to TRIPS flexibilities. To the contrary, Canada and other WTO members were
simply fortunate that Eli Lilly failed to satisfy its necessary burden of proof, such

267. E.g., Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 110 (noting organization of tribunal analysis). The
tribunal first evaluated whether jurisdiction was proper before any of these issues, although that is not
pertinent to TRIPS issues.
268. Id.; see also ¶ 307 (noting that parties agree a “[d]ramatic change” in the utility requirement
is a fundamental question and that Eli Lilly confirmed that it must establish this to win).
269. Pharma, Press Release, Pharma Statement on NAFTA Tribunal Decision in the Eli Lilly
Case, (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-nafta-tribunaldecision-in-the-eli-lilly-case [https://perma.cc/3KG3-ZH8Y].
270. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 102.
271. In particular, Eli Lilly alleges that the promise doctrine did not exist when the initial patents
were issued, such that the exception does not apply. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note
1, ¶ 69. However, there are disputes both as to whether the promise doctrine has been long in existence,
as well as how to interpret the NAFTA exception. See, e.g., Gold & Shortt, supra note 25, at 38, 50 (longstanding doctrine); Ho, supra note 110, at 259–60 (arguing that Eli Lilly’s claim should be rejected).
272. However, for details on expropriation, see Ho, supra note 110.
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that there was no need for the tribunal to address issues that could have conflicted
with TRIPS norms.
An initial issue at the intersection of TRIPS and investment claims is that Eli
Lilly argued that the exemption from expropriation for TRIPS-consistent claims
permits an investment tribunal to decide TRIPS disputes. Even though Australia
had argued that investment tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide TRIPS disputes
and even though NAFTA has an explicit exception from expropriation for
revocation of patent rights consistent with NAFTA (and inherently TRIPS), did not
halt the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada. Of course, Canada did not make the
same objection as Australia; although it did suggest that the tribunal lacks
jurisdiction to rule on breaches of international treaties such as TRIPS, it did not
suggest that the dispute should be entirely dismissed on this ground.273 However,
even if it had, it is unclear whether a tribunal would be sympathetic to this argument.
Although a few commentators have suggested that that there should be no
jurisdiction, the actual text could provide a basis for a tribunal to determine whether
Canada’s actions are consistent with NAFTA, and by implication TRIPS, which
could be why Canada did not suggest that there was no jurisdiction on this
ground.274
Eli Lilly’s assertion that the revocation of its patents was inconsistent with
NAFTA could have created a critical challenge for TRIPS flexibilities. NAFTA has
the same requirements for patents as TRIPS in that patents on inventions must be
granted when they are “useful,” among other requirements, but without defining
this term; so Eli Lilly essentially challenged TRIPS patentability requirements.275 Eli
Lilly made several arguments concerning this term. Initially, it argued that the
undefined term “useful” should mean what is stated in the Oxford Dictionary and
that any ambiguity should be resolved by referring to the laws of the United States
and Europe which allegedly formed the basis for these terms during the negotiating
process.276 Although WTO panels do often consult the Oxford Dictionary, that is
simply a starting place for assessing the ordinary and customary meaning of terms
consistent with interpretation of terms under customary interpretation of
international laws.277 There is no precedent for suggesting that international

273. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Counter Memorial, ¶¶ 209–
10 ( Jan. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Counter Memorial], http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw4131.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWU5-3YWV].
274. E.g., Frankel, supra note 114; see also NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7) (providing
exception to expropriation for intellectual property rights revoked “consistent” with the NAFTA
chapter on intellectual property). Canada raised a totally different jurisdictional objection based on
timing of the claim, which the tribunal considered unfounded. See Eli Lilly, Counter Memorial, supra
note 273.
275. Compare NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1709, with TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27.
276. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9–10 (quoting dictionary to support that
“useful” means “able to be used for a practical purpose or in several ways.”).
277. See Andreas Sennekamp & Isabelle Van Damme, A Practical Perspective on Treaty
Interpretation: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3
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agreements should be interpreted based on prior laws of members that were not
included in the agreement.278 Then, in its notice of arbitration, Eli Lilly suggested
that its drugs should be useful because they were consistent with the patent
examination guidelines in effect when Eli Lilly’s disputed patents were issued, and
that Canada’s modification of its patent laws since then to be “out of step” with
NAFTA members is improper.279 However, the fact that Canada’s laws are different
than those of other NAFTA and WTO member countries is explicitly contemplated
by the minimum standards of TRIPS. In addition, as other scholars have noted,
patent law has never been static and in fact new innovations often require
reinterpretation of relevant statutes, including reweighing of public and private
interests, such that corporate investors should expect modifications in the law.280
Although the panel did not technically address this issue, it did not consider
differences in member state laws to be necessarily of relevance.
Although the panel did not technically address whether Canada’s laws comply
with NAFTA, and thus TRIPS, it did provide some interesting statements. For,
example, in rejecting Eli Lilly’s suggestion that Canada’s unique law is inherently
significant, the tribunal noted that “it is difficult to see how a comparison across
jurisdictions can demonstrate a change over time within a single jurisdiction.”281 In
addition, the tribunal noted that although Eli Lilly assumes common law decisions
“must follow in a reasonably foreseeable and predictable channel, without
significant or material changes,” in fact, “evolution of the law through court
decisions is natural, and departures from precedent are to be expected.”282 Both of
these statements seem consistent with TRIPS flexibilities. Of course, whether other
tribunals will follow suit remains to be seen.
In addition, a different type of TRIPS flexibility was potentially vulnerable
based on Eli Lilly’s claim that the promise doctrine discriminates against
pharmaceuticals as a field of technology in violation of NAFTA and TRIPS.283
WTO jurisprudence makes an important distinction between legitimate
differentiation and improper discrimination, which is also supported by the
CAMBRIDGE J. INT ’ L & COMP. L. 489, 498 (2014) (dictionary as starting point for interpretation, but
not complete source).
278.
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Second Report of
Dr. Daniel Gervais, ¶ 17 (Dec. 7, 2015) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ITA%20LAW%207018.pdf [https://perma.cc/73ZP-ZMYM].
279. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8–9. Canada continues to suggest that
Canada’s different definition of “useful” for some inventions is necessarily suspect for being different
from NAFTA partners and because it has not been traditionally a patentability requirement for which
there were different views. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant’s PostHearing Memorial ( July 25, 2016) ¶¶ 48, 62–146 (NAFTA partners), 166–175 (no prior international
disagreement), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7465.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4VKD-ZQKG].
280. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 130, at 591.
281. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 377.
282. Id. ¶ 310; see also ¶ 324 (noting that although the promise doctrine did not play a significant
role before 2005, the rule was clearly “‘out there’, to be ignored at a patentee’s peril.”).
283. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 52.
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Declaration on Regulatory Sovereignty.284 A WTO panel has noted that there is no
prohibition against dealing with problems that may exist only in certain product
areas.285 Notably, the panel stated that even when a country intended to regulate a
particular area, it did not constitute implicit discrimination since “preoccupation”
with the impact of a law to one area is not discriminatory unless there is evidence
that the broader purpose is a “sham.”286 There is nothing to indicate that the
promise doctrine is a “sham.” Indeed, the Canadian Manual of Patent Procedure
uses a mechanical example in discussing this doctrine.287 The fact that more
pharmaceutical patents are invalidated could simply reflect that the industry is
violating the doctrine, rather than indicating that the doctrine discriminates against
the industry.288
The tribunal decision is consistent with prior WTO jurisprudence, even
though there was nothing to indicate that this was a goal of the tribunal. In
particular, the tribunal ruled that Eli Lilly’s statistical data did not support its claim
of improper discrimination that would give rise to a claim for violation of
international minimum standards of treatment, or fair and equitable treatment. The
tribunal noted that at most, Eli Lilly had shown a relationship between the promise
doctrine and higher invalidity rates in the pharmaceutical sector; there was nothing
to support a claim of improper discrimination. For example, the tribunal noted that
Canada’s argument that the patent practices of pharmaceutical companies could
result in more challenges was plausible289 and that there is no basis to infer
discriminatory intent.290
Although there was never a parallel WTO proceeding to the Eli Lilly
investment case, this case could have presented a greater systemic challenge than
the Philip Morris disputes. After all, while TRIPS flexibilities have been repeatedly
noted as important for patents, the trademark provisions in the Philip Morris case
have not typically been discussed as an essential part of TRIPS flexibilities. In
addition, the Eli Lilly case was the first challenge to TRIPS flexibilities on
patentability that could have resulted in an interpretation of TRIPS by an

284. E.g., Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9, ¶¶ 6–8; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS
Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 450–53 (2007) (agreeing with differentiation
goal and further arguing that there should be no discrimination so long as there is a legitimate purpose
demonstrated).
285. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.92, WTO
Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Mar. 17, 2000).
286. Id. ¶ 7.104.
287. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, K1A 0C9, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE
PRACTICE (2016), ¶ 12.08.
288. Indeed, it has long been recognized that uniform patent standards may result in different
application to different technologies. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003).
289. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 435.
290. Id. ¶ 438.
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international body.291 In the over twenty years since TRIPS was concluded,
countries have notably been cautious in challenging TRIPS flexibilities at the
WTO.292 For example, even the United States, which generally robustly argues for
broad IP interpretations, has not alleged that Canada’s laws violate TRIPS; the
United States has only noted a concern for potential innovation293 despite corporate
claims that TRIPS has been violated.294
The outcome of the Eli Lilly dispute was unclear even after Uruguay prevailed
against Philip Morris’ claims of expropriation, since the analysis of the Uruguay
tribunal—even if adopted—would not necessarily have provided immunity to
Canada’s ability to use TRIPS flexibilities. Notably, Uruguay’s tobacco regulations
were considered within its police power to protect public health.295 This is not
surprising since the regulations are consistent with the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control guidelines and no one contests that tobacco use
is harmful. In contrast, there is no uniform view of whether more patents on drugs
negatively impacts public health to support Canada’s interpretation of “useful” to
make it more difficult to obtain subsequent patents on a drug. Although public
health advocates have vigorously argued that additional patents such as those
obtained by Eli Lilly do not promote public health and therefore should not be
granted, limiting patent rights in such a situation is very different than limiting
trademarks on tobacco, a product that has universally admitted lethal consequences.
Revocation of the patents at issue would not protect consumers from the same type
of lethal consequences as more limited use of tobacco. Also, Canada’s judicial
interpretation of what is “useful” is unlike most public health issues found to be
within the scope of domestic police power, which typically is associated with
protecting the public from immediate public health harms, such as regulatory

291. Of course, there is an earlier WTO panel decision regarding the scope of the “limited
exception” to TRIPS patent rights under article 30. But, there is no panel report regarding basic
patentability under TRIPS article 27. Although the United States did initiate a dispute that alleged that
Brazil’s “local working” requirement violated TRIPS, including article 27, the parties settled this case.
Brazil v. U.S., Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, July 5, 2001. Some scholars have suggested
that initiation of a subsequently abandoned WTO dispute may nonetheless create a chilling effect on
use of TRIPS flexibilities. E.g., Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 130, at 600.
292. For example, although compulsory licensing is frequently contested, no country has ever
initiated a TRIPS dispute. Similarly, although India’s interpretation of TRIPS patentability requirements
under section 3d of its patent laws is regularly criticized, no country has initiated a TRIPS dispute against
India either.
293. See MICHAEL B.G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., SPECIAL 301 REPORT 66
(2015).
294. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, SPECIAL 301
SUBMISSION 81 (2015), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA-2015-Special-301Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AQ4-ZV94] (alleging that Canada’s interpretation of utility violates
TRIPS and NAFTA). Of course, the United States has taken other actions, such as entering into
agreements with other countries to raise patent requirements and thus need not directly challenge
TRIPS flexibilities at the WTO since it is directly circumventing them through other means.
295. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 382.
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measures to prevent an epidemic of infectious disease.296 Even if one accepts that
stringent patent standards promote public health by minimizing the harm of
unnecessary patent profits that made drugs unaffordable, this public health goal is
more attenuated and different than other previously recognized public health harms
that result in a clear and immediate harm. In addition, police power is traditionally
associated with domestic legislation and regulation, not judicial interpretation. Also,
the Uruguay tribunal accepted the amicus submissions of major international
organizations, such as the WHO that supported Uruguay’s interpretation of TRIPS
whereas no amicus briefs from similar entities were involved here, although some
were filed; moreover, the most detailed proposed amicus brief regarding TRIPS was
not accepted by the tribunal simply because it was not authored by citizens of
NAFTA member states.297 Even the types of patented drugs involved might seem
less essential to public health than tobacco regulation. In particular, although many
believe that “essential medicines” should be affordable, the patented drugs in the
Eli Lilly dispute do not fall in this category.
Canada was fortunate that the tribunal was sympathetic to its “legitimate
public policy” for the judicially crafted promise doctrine. The tribunal seemed quite
deferential to Canada in assessing whether the doctrine was arbitrary. The tribunal
simply reiterated Canada’s explanation that the doctrine helps ensure the public
receives the benefit of the patent bargain and encourages accuracy. It interestingly
noted that it “need not opine on whether the promise doctrine is the only, or the
best, means of achieving these objectives. The relevant point is that, in the
Tribunal’s view, the promise doctrine is rationally connected to these legitimate
policy goals.”298 Notably, a rational relation to policy goals seems a far lower
threshold for a nation to establish than whether action is within traditional police
power. The tribunal also noted that it had no role to “question the policy choices”
of a nation.299 Moreover, it rejected Eli Lilly’s contention that some uncertainty in
application of the promise doctrine made it arbitrary; in its view, that is true of all
legal regimes.300

296. Id. ¶¶ 298–99 (citing Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, UNCITRAL ¶ 266 (Aug. 2, 2010);
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, UNCITRAL,
Pt. IV, Ch. D, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005); Bischoff Case, Decision, 10 R.I.A.A. 420, 421 (1903)).
297. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order
No. 4 (Feb. 23, 2016), [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Procedural Order No. 4] http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7145.pdf [https://perma.cc/27GQ-MZLJ]; see also Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to File Amicus
Submissions (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw
7112.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PVY-3NXQ].
298. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 424; see also id. ¶ 428 (noting that Canada had “advanced
a legitimate justification. . . . Whether or not this is the preferred approach, it is plainly not an irrational
one.”).
299. Id. ¶ 426. The panel quoted from Professor Levin that “it is not the role of a NAFTA
Chapter Eleven tribunal to question the policy choices of a NAFTA party.” Id.
300. Id. ¶ 429.

Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete)

450

5/29/2017 11:04 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 6:395

The tribunal also found that Canada’s application of the promise doctrine was
not de facto discriminatory against pharmaceutical patents. The panel noted that Eli
Lilly’s claim of a causal relationship between the doctrine and higher invalidity rates
in the pharmaceutical sector was not supported by the facts.301 Eli Lilly’s expert
could only support the fact that the numbers of invalidations was not due to
chance.302 The tribunal noted that it was possible that the practices of such
companies result in more challenges on this ground and that although it could not
evaluate this claim, this helped to explain why Eli Lilly’s claim of causation was
lacking.303
The recent tribunal decision did not focus squarely on Eli Lilly’s expropriation
claim in the same way as the tribunal in the Philip Morris Uruguay decision. Granted,
the factual context was different, and there was an initial dispute regarding whether
a judicial act could even be the basis for a claim for expropriation or fair and
equitable treatment. The tribunal noted that judicial acts are attributable to a state
and that it could constitute an expropriation even without an actual denial of
justice.304 However, it took care to note that an investment tribunal is not intended
to provide an appellate review of domestic judicial decisions with regard to either
expropriation or FET claims—a point that it reiterated more than once.305
ii. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Eli Lilly also alleged that Canada violated minimum standards, including fair
and equitable treatment because the judicial invalidations are allegedly arbitrary and
inconsistent with its legitimate expectation of a stable business and legal
environment.306 In particular, Eli Lilly alleged that it could not have anticipated that
the Canadian law on utility would be “so drastically altered” and also “retroactively
applied” to invalidate its patents.307
Eli Lilly’s FET claim is the most significant challenge to TRIPS flexibilities
presented in the investment context thus far. Although the expropriation claim also
301. Id. ¶¶ 433, 437 (noting that the proposed causal link was based on mere assumptions).
302. Id. ¶ 434.
303. Id. ¶ 435.
304. Id. ¶ 221.
305. Id. (“[A] NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier with respect to national
judiciaries.”); Id., ¶ 225 (“[A] NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier with a mandate
to review the decisions of the national judiciary[.]”).
306. Technically, the claim is violation of minimum standard of treatment, which includes fair
and equitable treatment. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105. However, Eli Lilly’s claim does specifically
mention violation of fair and equitable treatment. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶
81–82. FET claims that are not linked to international minimum standards of treatment could be
considered broader, although even FET linked to a minimum standard of treatment can be broadly
interpreted. E.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair
and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals, INV. TREATY
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-theinterpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investmenttribunals/ [https://perma.cc/965A-5DTK].
307. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 82–83.
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challenged the same law, there is at least an exception to expropriation for
revocation of patents consistent with NAFTA and TRIPS provisions. Of course, as
noted previously, the application of this exception was disputed and ultimately not
even addressed by the tribunal. Nonetheless, there is at least a recognition for
expropriation claims that revocation of patent and other intellectual property rights
in some instances should not constitute expropriation. In contrast, there is no such
exception to FET claims in NAFTA or other investment agreements. Moreover,
FET claims tend to be broadly interpreted based on violating “legitimate
expectations” of investors.
If the tribunal had found for Eli Lilly, that would likely have completely halted
efforts by policy makers to encourage countries to modify domestic laws to better
enhance TRIPS flexibilities. Importantly, a negative decision for Canada would have
had a major chilling effect on the ability of any country to modify laws to take
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. This would have been contrary to the repeated
recommendation of policy makers that nations modify their laws to implement
TRIPS flexibilities. In addition, it would have been contrary to the embrace of such
flexibilities in the Declaration of Regulatory Sovereignty.308
There were grounds for the tribunal to reject Eli Lilly’s argument that a
country can never modify its laws after an agreement or else be found in breach of
fair and equitable treatment. In particular, there is no traditional understanding that
members to an agreement must not thereafter modify their laws; indeed, multiple
policy reports since the conclusion of TRIPS are premised on the assumption that
countries can and should modify their laws.309 And, Eli Lilly’s suggestion is in fact
contrary to domestic patent law practice in which changes in common law regularly
invalidate patents issued under a different standard.310 The tribunal properly
rejected Eli Lilly’s assumption that common law decisions must “following a
reasonably foreseeable and predictable channel without significant or material
changes.”311 Rather, the tribunal noted that common law evolution necessarily
involves departures from precedent.312 However, the tribunal’s decision was not a
foregone conclusion. After all, past tribunals have previously been sympathetic to
investor claims, and especially FET claims, although there are no prior cases
involving changes in common law. In addition, an early article by a commercial
308. See Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9.
309. See, e.g., supra note 8.
310. For example, patents have been invalidated following recent Supreme Court cases
narrowing the scope of patentability. E.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714–16
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating patent in light of 2014 Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. narrowing
patent eligibility after twice finding the patent valid); Steven Seidenberg, After Alice: Business-method
and Software Patents May Go Through the Looking Glass, 101 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2015, at 19; Donald
Vinson, Key Cases Shaping the Future for Patent Litigation Funders, LAW 360 (Apr. 27, 2015, 10:13
AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/646193/print?section=ip [https://perma.cc/P5YC-C6MS]
(noting that patent owners may reconsider pursuing infringement in light of the potential for validity
challenges).
311. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 310.
312. See id.
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lawyer, the type of individual likely appointed an arbitrator by an investor, was
sympathetic to Eli Lilly’s position.313 Accordingly, the assumption of IP scholars
that this claim would necessarily fail was always questionable.314
Moreover, even though a majority of the Philip Morris tribunal found no FET
violation by Uruguay, the reasoning would not have been helpful to Canada against
Eli Lilly’s claims. First, whereas the majority in the Uruguay panel found that
tobacco companies had no legitimate expectation that nations would not modify
regulations, it was much less clear that the Eli Lilly tribunal would concur.315 In
addition, although a majority of the tribunal found that Uruguay’s two regulations
were not arbitrary, one tribunalist contested that the regulation not explicitly
recommended by WHO guidelines violated FET. Notably, that tribunalist found it
significant that “no other country in the world” had a similar requirement, as well
as the fact that there was “no meaningful prior study, internal debate or external
consultation.”316 These arguments seem to mirror what Eli Lilly repeatedly noted—
that Canada’s law is unique and that the Canadian judiciary allegedly arbitrarily
imposed the disputed promise doctrine. In addition, although the dissenting
tribunalist recognized that a state could legitimately enact a measure that advances
a legitimate governmental objective, it is unclear that a tribunal would find a clear
governmental objective in judicial cases mandating a promise doctrine, or that the
doctrine in fact supports an objective of public health.317 Notably, even though
tobacco is a lethal product, the dissenting opinion in the Uruguay case was not
persuaded that the “single presentation requirement” actually achieved the purpose
of preventing misleading use of trademarks beyond previous laws. Also, although
the majority was sympathetic to Uruguay and noted a margin of appreciation to
government regulatory acts, the dissent affirmatively rejected the relevance of a
margin of appreciation.
Although the reasoning of the Uruguay tribunal did not apply to the Canadian
tribunal evaluating Eli Lilly’s claim, the latter tribunal still found grounds to reject
Eli Lilly’s claim—and perhaps provide a glimmer of hope for other disputes. In
particular, even though the health impacts of expensive patented drugs are not
recognized in the same way as tobacco use, Canada won in a unanimous decision,
whereas there was still a dissent to the overall favorable decision to Uruguay. Of
course, the tribunal finding in Canada’s favor did not characterize the issue as one
of whether it is wise to limit patents on drugs that may result in higher cost. Rather,
it simply considered whether the stated justification for the domestic law had some
basis. If other tribunals used a similar criteria, that would seem to preserve TRIPS

313. See M.L. Seelig, Can Patent Revocation or Invalidation Constitute a Form of Expropriation?,
6 TRANS. DISP. MGMT. 1, 8–9 (2009).
314. E.g., Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 114.
315. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 430.
316. Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, ¶¶ 5, 167,( July 8, 2016).
317. Id. ¶ 137.
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flexibilities. However, as noted earlier, the majority in the Uruguay decision required
a higher threshold relating to police power.. Of course, future tribunals are not
bound to either approach and can adopt yet a different approach that could still
encroach upon TRIPS flexibility. For example, the dissent in the Uruguay decision
suggested that simply having a different approach than other countries could be
suspect. So, while Canada’s win is a positive development, it does not ensure that
TRIPS flexibilities are immune from conflicts in future investor disputes.
Also, although the Eli Lilly tribunal repeatedly noted that it was not intended
to provide appellate review of domestic judicial decisions, it nonetheless left open
the possibility that some judicial measures may give rise to a claim for FET, as well
as expropriation. In particular, for FET claims, the tribunal noted that such a claim
could exist with respect to a decision that is “egregious and shocking,” even while
stating that there should be “considerable deference” to domestic courts.318
Canada’s change in the law was found not to be “dramatic” and thus failed to meet
this standard. But, it remains to be seen how other tribunals might view challenges
to judicial actions, which is a relatively new area in investor-disputes.
B. Potential Problems
There are a variety of potential conflicts that could arise if investment tribunals
adjudicate more claims that touch upon TRIPS flexibilities. Although any TRIPS
flexibility is potentially vulnerable to an investment claim, some types of TRIPS
flexibilities seem more likely to be subject to such claims. Accordingly, this Section
will briefly provide an overview of some flexibilities under the Declaration that are
at risk.319
1. Patentability Standards
If Eli Lilly prevails against Canada on any ground, it will likely have a chilling
effect on domestic efforts to tailor patentability standards for any country that is
subject to an investment agreement. The chilling effect is actually twofold. First,
countries that had been previously considering modifying patent standards to use
TRIPS flexibilities may no longer do so for fear of claims of expropriation and,
especially, fair and equitable treatment. Worse yet, countries that have laws that take
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities, such as India, may feel pressure to jettison such
flexibilities to avoid vulnerability for investment claims. Although India has not
specifically signaled any intent to modify its patent laws, its 2016 model investment

318. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 224.
319. This is of course not intended to be comprehensive, but, instead explain a range of
different types of flexibilities at risk. Another possible TRIPS flexibility at risk is whether countries can
impose a “local working” requirement since there was a TRIPS dispute initiated in 2001. However,
since that did occur, but did not result in an actual panel report, countries may already be predisposed
not to use this flexibility, such that it is not discussed here.
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agreement suggests greater encroachment on TRIPS flexibilities than the proposed
2015 draft.320
Any change to Indian patent law presents a serious international problem
because India is the predominant source of low-cost generic drugs to the developing
world. It has thus far been able to do so because of patent laws that provide less
protection than most other countries, such as the United States.321 However, if that
changes, the only way that India could continue to make and sell generics would be
to issue compulsory licenses, but that in itself could subject India to a separate basis
for an investment claim. Although many investment agreements technically have an
exception to expropriation claims for compulsory licenses that are “consistent” with
TRIPS, an investment tribunal would still be deciding whether a domestically issued
license is consistent with TRIPS.322 Given a wide divergence in views on TRIPS
requirements by government officials and companies, a country could be vulnerable
to an expropriation claim under an investment agreement for a license that not only
complies with TRIPS, but would be unlikely challenged at the WTO.323 After all, a
number of countries have issued compulsory licenses since TRIPS was enacted, and
although companies and even some countries have loudly protested,324 no country
has ever initiated a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.325
2. Denial of Permanent/Preliminary Injunction
Another possible TRIPS flexibility that may be at risk is the flexibility to deny
permanent or even preliminary injunctions for cases of alleged patent infringement.
320. Compare Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art 2.4(iii) (2016)
[hereinafter Indian Model BIT 2016], http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/modelbit_annex.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KUY7-7PMB] (exempting from revocation, limitation or creation of rights arguably
consistent with TRIPS, which would permit an investment tribunal to decide this), with Model Text for
the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 2.6(v) (2015) [hereinafter Indian Model BIT 2015],
https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%
20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W7F-YR55] (excluding
from scope of arbitration compulsory licenses, as well as revocation, limitation of IP if “consistent with
the law of the host state.”).
321. E.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, supra note 35 (barring patents on new variations of
existing compounds unless they provide improved efficacy).
322. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7) (exception to indirect expropriation); TPP, supra
note 40, art. 9.8(5) (exception to indirect expropriation).
323. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction
Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT ’ L L. & COM. REG. 371 (2009); see also, Christopher Gibson,
A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM.
U. INT ’ L L. REV. 357, 386 (2010). Most early commentary concerning the intersection of IP and
investment claims focused on compulsory licenses. E.g., Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to
Medicines, Expropriation and Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Agreements—Issues Beyond TRIPS,
40 INT ’ L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 152 (2009).
324. For example, Thailand and India have both issued compulsory licenses that have been
strongly contested. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 323, at 168; Vasani et al., supra note 121.
325. See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Index of Dispute Issues, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#selected_subject [https://
perma.cc/PM8A-G6NP] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (containing no dispute relating to compulsory
licenses).
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TRIPS notably requires nations to have a system in place to award such injunctions
but does not demand that domestic courts grant them in particular situations.326
However, since Eli Lilly seems to believe that an issued patent needs to be forever
valid to preserve fundamental patent exclusivity,327 a company could be expected to
claim that injunctions are also part of patent exclusivity. A domestic court decision
that declined to provide such an injunction would not be an automatic violation of
investment claims. Nonetheless, it could form the basis of a claim that the value of
the rights was “expropriated.” This could be yet another situation where a company
could obtain greater rights than under domestic laws that do not guarantee either
permanent or preliminary injunctions.328 Alternatively, a company could claim that
it had a legitimate expectation that an injunction would issue, such that there is a
violation of fair and equitable treatment if that does not occur. This is especially
true if the Eli Lilly tribunal is sympathetic to Eli Lilly’s position that there should
be a legitimate expectation that a patent right entitles its owner to absolute
exclusivity.
3. No Data Exclusivity
Yet another possible TRIPS flexibility at risk relates to undisclosed
information as required under TRIPS Article 39.329 Technically, this provision is not
part of TRIPS patent rights, but it is covered in the Declaration on Patent Protection
and generally considered part of the patent flexibilities that countries use.330
There are extremely divergent views on what TRIPS Article 39 requires. Some
believe that TRIPS requires U.S. style “data exclusivity” that essentially bars generic
companies from relying on the clinical data of a pioneer drug for obtaining
regulatory approval for a certain period of time.331 Other scholars, policy makers,
and even some countries consider it to only require “data protection,” which means
protecting the data submitted to a regulatory agency from unfair competition, but
326. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 44.
327. E.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 78 (alleging that invalidation of patents
constitutes expropriation that is “contrary to the public purpose that is inherent in the grant of a
patent . . . pursuant to which the patentee receives an exclusive right.”).
328. See, e.g., Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (clarifying that patent
owners are not automatically entitled to a permanent injunction even after they establish infringement).
329. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 39.
330. Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9, ¶ 35–36.
331. E.g., ORG. OF PHARM PRODUCERS OF INDIA, OPPI OPPOSITION PAPER, REGULATORY
DATA PROTECTION —A BUILDING BLOCK FOR PHARMACEUTICAL R&D (2008); NUNO PIRES DE
CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 392–93 (2d ed. 2005). See also 21 C.F.R. §
314.108 (2012) (noting a five-year period of exclusivity in the United States: “(2) If a drug product that
contains a new chemical entity was approved after September 24, 1984, in an application submitted
under section 505(b) of the act, no person may submit a 505(b)(2) application or abbreviated new drug
application under section 505( j) of the act for a drug product that contains the same active moiety as
in the new chemical entity for a period of 5 years from the date of approval of the first approved new
drug application, except that the 505(b)(2) application or abbreviated application may be submitted
after 4 years if it contains a certification of patent invalidity or noninfringement described in
314.50(i)(1)(i)(A)(4) or 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).”).
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does not necessarily mean reliance of the data by a generic company that never has
physical access to the data.332 A few take an intermediate position and find that
TRIPS precludes generic companies from relying on the data of another company
without paying some fee.333
A company could claim that a country that does not provide data exclusivity,
such as India, is indirectly expropriating its data by permitting a proposed generic
company to immediately rely on clinical data of the original company to establish
bioequivalence immediately after the originator is approved.334 Clinical data is
expensive to develop and thus would seem to easily fall within the definition of an
investment. Innovator companies complain this is fundamentally unfair for
countries not to provide data exclusivity, with some arguing that this violates
TRIPS.335 There is obviously no consensus on this issue. Importantly, it is
considered a type of TRIPS flexibility to not provide data exclusivity as a matter of
public policy. Although not highlighted by innovator companies, data exclusivity
often provides more protection than patents by barring generic entry—even if the
patented drug may in fact be subject to an invalid patent since the majority of drug
patents are found invalid when challenged.336 If there is no data exclusivity, a
country can quickly approve a generic equivalent and let the generic company legally
contest whether the drug is properly patented.337 A generic company is not likely to
332. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
383–92 (2008); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, 34 AM. J. L. &
MED. 303, 315–16 (2008); Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Test Data under the TRIPS Agreement
and its Progeny (UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue Paper 2004), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
bellagio/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQK-56QT]. But see NUNO PIRES DE
CARVALHO, supra note 331.
333. See, e.g., Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data under Article 39.3 of TRIPS: The
Indian Context, 28–29 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934269; Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection
of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. INT ’ L L.J. 443, 446 (2004). However,
this interpretation seems to be inconsistent with appropriate interpretation of TRIPS since there was
an explicit proposal to require cost-sharing that was rejected. Draft Agreement on the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from the United States, art. 33, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) (suggesting one alternative to permitting use of originator
data would involve “payment of reasonable value of the use”).
334. See, e.g., HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 32, at 119.
335. E.g., PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016, at 46, 94 (2016) (arguing that India and
Brazil violate TRIPS by not providing data exclusivity); BIO SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016, at 16–17,
46 (2016) (arguing Brazil and India presently violate TRIPS by not providing data exclusivity); see also
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 8
(2000) (arguing that countries lacking data exclusivity, such as South Africa, Brazil, Israel and Ecuador,
violate TRIPS).
336. See, e.g., Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, at 191 ( July 8, 2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MR5Z-A6K6]; FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO
PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 20 (2002).
337. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Beyond Patents: Global Challenges to Affordable Medicine, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 302, 304 (I. Glen Cohen ed.,
2013).
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undertake such a contest lightly given the risks of litigation, but at least the public
interest in lower cost generics is recognized and not stifled; this seems particularly
important if a patent were in fact invalid. However, it is unclear whether a tribunal
would be sensitive to these policy concerns. In addition, although there is an
exception to indirect expropriation for denial of intellectual property rights
consistent with TRIPS, lack of data exclusivity is not a prototypical denial of rights
in the same way as a denial of a patent application since there is no separate
application to obtain this benefit. Moreover, the exception would still result in an
investment tribunal, rather than a WTO panel, deciding on TRIPS compliance.
Even if there is no finding of indirect expropriation for a country that declines
to provide data exclusivity, this could still be the basis for a claim of violation of fair
and equitable treatment. A company could make a claim similar to Philip Morris in
the Australia case that it has a purported legitimate interest in a country “complying”
with TRIPS by providing data exclusivity based on its belief that this is what TRIPS
requires.338 This would obviously create a conflict with TRIPS flexibilities and have
a serious chilling effect.
III. ADDRESSING CURRENT CONFLICT
Although current investment agreements pose a threat to TRIPS flexibilities,
there are nonetheless steps that can be taken to minimize conflicts between TRIPS
flexibilities and the investment system.339 First, the scope of covered investments
could be narrowed. Second, if IP claims were not more broadly excluded,
investment claims could be more narrowly construed to promote TRIPS
flexibilities. Third, the scope of dispute settlement could be modified to minimize
or completely eliminate conflict with TRIPS flexibilities. These can be most easily
done in future treaties, but existing agreements can be amended, or at least clarifying
statements could be issued in hopes of achieving similar outcomes.340
A. Narrow Scope
There are two primary ways in which the scope of coverage of investments
could be modified to minimize overlap with IP norms. In particular, the definition
of what a covered investment is could be narrowed, or investment claims
themselves could be narrowed. Although some recent agreements have aimed to
narrow investment claims to cabin undue impact on sovereignty, this Section goes
338. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.7 (alleging FET claim based on
violation of international law).
339. This focuses on solutions that assume countries do not exit from investment treaties, or
ICSID, which is an alternative possibility, but not a complete one since it would only eliminate
prospective claims.
340. This is particularly true for investment agreements to which the United States is a party
since the United States has generally included language that permits nations to provide clarifying
statements that should then be binding on member states. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1131.2;
TPP, supra note 40, art. 27.2(2)(f ); see also CETA, supra note 15 (permitting binding interpretations
regarding intellectual property).
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further to address the IP-specific conflict for future agreements. However, for
existing agreements, one additional option is for states to exclude IP from ICSID
disputes under Article 25(4) of ICSID.341 Although no state has yet done so for IP,
there have been notifications for other topics.342 One possible downside to this is
that it may be overbroad in excluding all IP, even if there were no possible TRIPS
conflicts.
1. Limit the Scope of Covered Investments
Future agreements that could arguably exclude IP from the scope of
investments are unlikely to happen. Furthermore, focusing solely on future
agreements would do little to address the many existing agreements under which IP
is explicitly or implicitly covered as an investment. Accordingly, this Section
suggests some modest modifications such as modifying the scope of investments
that results in jurisdiction, as well as modifying the type of intellectual property that
is covered.
One way to minimize TRIPS collisions is to narrow the scope of what
constitutes an investment that gives rise to an investor-state dispute. In particular,
tribunals should only find jurisdiction if there is an investment that meets the criteria
noted in the Salini decision, which includes contribution of investment to the
economic development of the host state that is beneficial to the public interest.343
Of course, not all tribunals have followed this decision, even when they cite it.344
However, this is especially important in the context of intellectual property since
simply obtaining a patent or trademark in a country does not directly benefit the
host country in the same way as traditional types of investments. For example,
investing in a physical plant would result in hiring of employees in that country as
well as other economic benefits. However, mere grant of a patent will not result in
any economic benefit. To the contrary, grant of a patent in a country often results
in economic loss to a country when the patent is to a foreigner who can then charge
341. ICSID Convention, supra note 63, art. 25(4).
342. For example, Guatemala eliminated claims arising from armed conflicts, Indonesia
eliminated claims for administrative decisions, and Jamaica eliminated claims relating to natural
resources. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], Notifications
Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered Suitable or Unsuitable for Submission to the Centre, ICSID/8-D
(May 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Notifications-Concerning-Classes-ofDispute-(ICSID8D).aspx [https://perma.cc/85B3-SST8].
343. Salini Costructtori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Moroco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4
(Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001). In addition, although Salini was interpreting article 25(1) of
ICSID, its interpretation has been affirmed in non-ICSID cases. E.g., Romak SA v. The Republic of
Uzbekistan, Case No. AA280, 53 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2009) (noting that even if an investor resorts to
UNCITRAL, Salini is relevant).
344. E.g., Consortium Groupment v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case
NO. ARB/03/8, Award of Jan. 10, 2005, ¶ 13(iv) (rejecting criteria of contribution to investment to
economic development); LESI v. Algeria, ICSID Case NO. ARB 05/03, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶ 72(iv) (finding contribution to host state economic development irrelevant); P.M. v. Uru., Decision
on Jurisdiction, supra note 206, ¶ 204-210 (2013); ¶ 220 (rejecting economic development as an
unnecessary element).
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higher prices for a patented good. There is some academic support for following
Salini in general, as well as with IP in particular.345 Notably, while there is no
investor-state tribunal decision on this specific issue, the relatively recent Apotex
decision supports the idea that mere application of a property right is not enough
to be an investment that justifies an investor-state dispute.346
The definition of intellectual property could also be clarified to exclude a mere
application. This would be consistent with long-recognized intellectual property
policy that there are no rights attendant to a mere application. In addition, denials
of applications and revocations of intellectual property could be entirely excluded
from the scope of investments where they are consistent with domestic law, as
decided by domestic courts.347 Using domestic law, rather than TRIPS consistency,
as the relevant criteria would ensure that investment tribunals have no occasion to
interpret TRIPS norms and disrupt them.
While companies would likely protest these suggestions as inconsistent with
international investment provisions, such a claim fails to recognize a fundamental
difference between intellectual and real property. Intellectual property rights are
inherently creations of governments that should not be considered to exist if a
nation finds that they fail to meet the basic requirements. Real and personal
property, on the other hand, do not depend on government action to exist. In
addition, if there was a problem with the process for issuing an intellectual property
rights, such as arbitrary denial, the process itself could be challenged under an
investment agreement as arbitrary or lacking due process. However, the simple
denial of a right itself should not give rise to a claim.
2. Narrow Investment Claims
If the types of intellectual property covered under investments cannot be
adequately cabined to alleviate conflicts, an alternative approach would be to narrow
the scope of specific investment claims. Since expropriation and FET claims can
345. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law is Reconceptualizing IP, 36 MICH. J. INT ’ L L. 557 (2015); Okediji, supra note 37, at
1137; Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini,
15 CHI. J. INT ’ L L. 287 (2014). But see THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 134 (Schreuer et
al. eds., 2009); D. Mortenson, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of
International Investment Law”, 51 HARV. INT ’ L L.J. 257 (2010).
346. Apotex v. Gov’t of the United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF/12/1, Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 158, 243 ( June 14, 2013).
347. See, e.g., European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Note for the Attention of the
Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment), art. X.11 ¶ 5, E.U. Doc. Trade B2/CBA/eg/Ares
1151153 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://docplayer.net/1529313-Section-1-scope-and-definitions-article-x-1scope-of-application-a-air-services-and-related-services-in-support-of-air-services-other-than.html
[https://perma.cc/Z8A5-WM9L] (noting that Canada proposed that expropriation be barred for a
“decision by a court, administrative tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property authority,
limiting or creating an intellectual property right except where the decision amounts to a denial of justice
or an abuse of right”); Indian Model BIT 2015, supra note 320 (stating that “revocation, limitation or
creation of intellectual property rights” are excluded as investments under the treaty if “consistent with
the law of the Host State.”).
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clearly impact TRIPS norms, this Section provides specific proposals for limiting
how these claims conflict with TRIPS.348
3. Expropriation
Although investment agreements generally already have an exception to
indirect expropriation claims for denial or revocation of intellectual property rights,
the Eli Lilly case underscores inadequacies with the provision.349 After all, this
provision generally only exempts claims that are consistent with TRIPS, or
potentially a TRIPS-plus agreement.350 This means that an investment tribunal
decides consistency with TRIPS, rather than a WTO tribunal.
There are a variety of possible ways to minimize the conflict. One would be
to exclude intellectual property claims entirely from possible claims for indirect
expropriation by investors and instead only permit them to be raised through stateto-state challenges.351 Another possibility is to exempt from indirect expropriation
IP revocations and denials that are consistent with the domestic law, so long as there
is no abuse of process.352 This would avoid TRIPS conflicts, but would still enable
a tribunal to essentially second-guess whether domestic law was properly applied.
4. FET
The most problematic claims are Fair and Equitable Treatment claims for IP
rights. Unlike the situation with expropriation claims, existing agreements do not
even have any exception to such claims for any types of IP. Moreover, Philip
Morris’s claims against Australia highlight how creative interpretations of these
claims could directly interfere with TRIPS if a panel agreed that an alleged violation
of TRIPS could constitute violation of FET.353 Although most scholars that have
considered the issue have argued that tribunals should interpret investment claims
to preserve TRIPS flexibility, that approach seems unlikely since tribunals tend to
rule in favor of investors, rather than consider other international agreements that

348. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 57–58 (explaining that
ideally investment agreements should either exclude “umbrella” clauses that permit a tribunal to decide
whether there has been a violation of any other agreement, or at least clarify that this excludes
international agreements such as TRIPS to prevent claims).
349. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 110(2). Indeed, the existence of this provision did not
prevent filing of the case against Eli Lilly as earlier discussed. See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying
text (section on expropriation claims in Eli Lilly case).
350. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7); TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.8(5); CETA, supra note
15, art. 8.12(5).
351. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens Intellectual Property
Limitations and Exceptions, IP WATCH (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/03/26/
how-the-leaked-tpp-isds-chapter-threatens-intellectual-property-limitations-and-exceptions/ [https://
perma.cc/DN73-HRAQ] (recognizing and suggesting this approach).
352. India has suggested this in its 2015 draft model BIT. Indian Model BIT 2015, supra note
320.
353. See, e.g., P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.7 (alleging FET claim based
on violation of international law).
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are not specifically referenced in the investment agreement. Accordingly, new FET
text, or interpretive statements to clarify what existing FET claims should mean is
necessary.
There are a variety of approaches that can be taken to minimize the incursion
of FET claims on TRIPS flexibilities going forward. First, such claims could be
entirely eliminated.354 Or, at least eliminate claims based on “legitimate
expectations,” because those are the broadest rights and instead limit FET to
situations where there is denial of justice.355 Alternatively, FET claims could
preclude ones involving TRIPS; many agreements already preclude investment
claims based on FET involving tax or other financial matters.356 Unless TRIPS
claims are barred, or limited to denial of justice situations, there are still potential
problems; for example, although the TPP attempts to clarify that breach of another
agreement does not alone constitute a violation of FET, this would still permit a
tribunal to consider a TRIPS breach and potentially use that as a basis for finding
FET. Accordingly, the other suggested approaches are preferable.
B. Modify Dispute Settlement
Conflicts with TRIPS flexibilities may also be avoided by fundamental
modifications to the dispute settlement process. There are a variety of ways this can
be done. First, investment claims involving intellectual property as an investment
could be limited to state to state action, or require state consent before an investor
can assert a claim. Second, investment claims premised on adjudication of TRIPS
rights could be excluded. Third, a hybrid dispute settlement system involving
potential additional action by the WTO could be created.
One approach that would likely minimize TRIPS conflicts is to require
investment claims premised on IP to be limited to claims by states. Notably, states
would still have the power to assert claims, such that conflict would not be
completely eliminated, although it would better parallel the WTO process and at
least reduce the number of likely conflicts since states are more discerning in
bringing disputes. Investment agreements already permit state-to-state adjudication
and for some subject matter, only state-to-state disputes are permitted.357 Although
there have been long standing exceptions for national security, and some types of
354. This is especially true for agreements between nations with well-developed legal
systems. See, e.g., Draft Report Containing the European Parliament’s Recommendations to the
Commission on the Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ( TTIP), ¶ xiv,
EUR. PARL. DOC. 2014/2228 (INI) (Feb. 5, 2015) (explaining that ISDS is not necessary between
the United States and the European Union given their robust legal systems).
355. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10 (FET claims linked to denial of justice); Indian
Model BIT, supra note 320, art. 4 (national treatment); JOHNSON & SACHS, supra note 54 (suggesting
eliminating this entirely or leaving it only subject to state-to-state resolution). TPP, however, does not.
E.g., TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6.
356. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.6 (excluding financial service investments); William
Park, Tax Arbitration and Investor Protection, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 227,
238 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford, eds., 2009).
357. As noted earlier, this is already the case for some types of tax claims.
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tax, the TPP recently added a “carve out” of investor-disputes for tobacco
regulations.358 However, this carve out was a political compromise after some
advocated a broader exception for more types of public interests and this limited
exception was noted as potentially problematic for obtaining congressional
approval.359 Accordingly, an exclusion for IP claims may be unlikely, especially given
the power of the pharmaceutical lobby.
Alternatively, investors could be permitted to still bring claims based on
alleged IP investments, but only if there is first specific consent by the host nation.
For example, many investment agreements not only restrict what investment claims
can be brought based on taxes, but only permit arbitration after the host state and
investor have first considered whether an investment claim is appropriate.360 A
similar provision could be added that would require domestic consent before an
investor can assert a claim that might comprise TRIPS flexibilities. Although some
might suggest that taxes are more essential to domestic sovereignty and thus entitled
to different rules that do not apply to other areas, some commentators have noted
that this distinction is not robust.361 Although companies would likely assert that
this is radical and unfair, considering that there is not a long tradition of states
asserting investment claims based on IP, this is not a major change. Moreover,
corporate claims and interests do not align with TRIPS norms and only considering
their issues would fail to preserve TRIPS flexibilities.
A more modest change that would still minimize TRIPS conflicts would be to
exclude from investor claims any situation that requires adjudication of TRIPS
rights. This could be based on existing language involving tax or environmental
agreements that states which international agreement prevails in the event of an
inconsistency.362 However, whereas these existing agreements focus on an explicit
conflict, the problem for IP claims may be a systemic conflict for which more than
358. TPP, supra note 40, art. 29.5.
359. See, e.g., Lukasz Gruszcynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the ISDS CarveOut for Tobacco Control Measures, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 652 (2015); Mike Masnick, The TPP and the
Tobacco Carve-Out Bring Together Strange Bedfellows . . . While Highlighting The Problems of the TPP,
TECHDIRT (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20151005/15595532440/tpp-tobaccocarveout-bring-together-strange-bedfellows-while-highlighting-problems-tpp.shtml
[https://
perma.cc/9PZ5-TFMM]; Wendy Parmet, Trade, Health and Tobacco Exceptionalism: The TPP Tobacco
Carve Out, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2015/11/10/trade-health-and-tobacco-exceptionalism-the-tpp-tobacco-carve-out/ [https://
perma.cc/WYM2-UTS9]. Congressional approval is a moot issue with regard to the TPP, but the
difficulty of getting the approval of even the limited tobacco carve-out suggests difficulty with a broader
exclusion of IP claims.
360. See, e.g., ECT art. 21(5) (for expropriation claims, investor must refer the issue to
the relevant Tax Authority; NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2103(6) (explaining that competent authorities
to assess whether the measure is an expropriation); see also TPP in Focus: Investment
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement—The Need for Reform, WAYS AND MEANS COMM. DEMOCRATS
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/blog/tpp-focusinvestment-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement-need-reform [https://perma.cc/75WV-53BS].
361. E.g., PARK, supra note 8, at 233.
362. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, arts. 103, 2103; see also Guillermo Alvarez & William Park,
The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT ’ L L. 365, 390 (2003).
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a simple conflict of law choice is needed. One possibility would be to preclude
adjudication of any claim that requires adjudication of a TRIPS provision unless it
has been previously determined to be in violation of TRIPS by a WTO panel. This
still may be inadequate, however, since investment claims do not necessarily require
an actual TRIPS violation. Accordingly, this could be phrased more broadly to
preclude any claim involving rights and flexibilities under TRIPS from adjudication
unless and until there has been a finding of TRIPS violation by the WTO. This
would preclude a systemic collision, but may not find support of countries desiring
strong investment rights, such as the United States. In addition, there is a logistical
problem in that not every investment case has a parallel WTO proceeding.
However, this problem can be solved with a new hybrid dispute settlement
proceeding.
Investment disputes based on IP that might challenge TRIPS flexibilities could
minimize incursion on TRIPS norms with a hybrid system.363 For example, if there
is an investment claim that inherently involves TRIPS flexibilities, but no related
WTO dispute, perhaps the investment claim could be stayed while the WTO system
evaluates the TRIPS issues and then the investment tribunal should defer to this
ruling. Of course, there is no precedent in international law in general, but perhaps
interpretive statements or amendments to existing agreements could state that
tribunals should defer to the WTO. Notably, not every investment claim will involve
a related WTO dispute or a direct interpretation of TRIPS rules. However, all
indirect expropriation claims where the exception based on TRIPS consistency is at
issue would be relevant. The harder issue is for FET claims where there is no
exception for IP, let alone TRIPS consistent action by states.364 However, perhaps
the WTO could help provide interpretive guidance on the impact of a FET ruling
on TRIPS norms in such a case even if no state initiates a formal WTO dispute. For
example, in a case such as Eli Lilly’s challenge to Canada’s norms, the WTO could
potentially provide insight into the impact on TRIPS flexibilities.
A number of logistical issues would need to be addressed to put this plan in
place. First, because the DSU only permits parties to bring disputes, there is no
current mechanism for a WTO panel to assess TRIPS issues if no country is willing
to bring a dispute.365 However, the existing and potential conflicts noted here
indicate that there is a real threat to TRIPS flexibilities if nothing is done.
363. Another possibility is to bring investment claims within the scope of the WTO, although
that seems unlikely because prior negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) failed
and the TRIMS Agreement that was negotiated as part of the WTO fell short of goals first proposed
as part of the MAI. See, e.g., Susan Sell, Cat and Mouse: Forum-Shifting in the Battle over Intellectual
Property Enforcement, at 9 (draft, prepared for IGIS Research Seminar), www.gwu.edu/~igis/
Sell%20Paper.doc [https://perma.cc/3V5L-94NG]. Notably, developing countries have previously
argued that IP issues should be solely a matter of domestic control, and not subject to international
commercial arbitration. See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World
Viewpoint, J. INT ’L ARB. 7, 19–20 (1989).
364. Compare TPP, supra note 40, art 9.8(5) (exception to indirect expropriation), with TPP, supra
note 40, art 9.6 (FET claims with no exception).
365. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 4, at art. 22.
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Considering that the WTO Dispute Settlement was intended to be the sole process
for resolving interpretations of WTO agreements such as TRIPS, amendments to
ensure that this can exist in a world where investment claims based on arguable
TRIPS violations would seem consistent with the original intent of the agreement.
Alternatively, perhaps another WTO organ, such as the WTO General Counsel,
could consider specific issues upon request. Alternatively, the WTO General
Council could be tasked with finding a solution to the conflict between investment
claims and TRIPS norms. This body has, in the past, found a solution to a TRIPS
specific problem concerning poor countries that could not take advantage of the
TRIPS compulsory licensing flexibility.366
Even if a complete overhaul of the dispute resolution process is not
undertaken, raising awareness at the WTO of the impending conflict between
investment claims and TRIPS norms would be an important first step. Notably,
there has not been substantial discussion in the WTO arena thus far concerning the
potential for investment claims to overshadow TRIPS rights and norms. There has
been discussion of the tobacco dispute, but it tends to focus more on general
domestic sovereignty, rather than a threat to TRIPS conflicts.367 In addition, there
is virtually no discussion relating to the Eli Lilly case, which has a much bigger
potential impact on patent flexibilities that would promote access to medicine. So,
a first step might be for member states to raise this issue at a WTO meeting. India
has expressed some awareness of this problem and has raised it at the World Health
Assembly, but not thus far at the WTO.368
At the same time, increased awareness and cross-fertilization in the investment
arena of TRIPS norms would be desirable. For example, perhaps pending
agreements could explicitly note that they do not modify rights under TRIPS or
refer to TRIPS and other documents to help provide specific contextual balance to
counter investment claims. For example, just as some agreements have been adding

366. WTO Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,
Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [https://perma.cc/KYE6-KZFD];
Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/XPX4MDTW] (listing limited number of countries far fewer than the two third of member countries required
to pass a WTO amendment).
367. E.g., Catherine Saez, Tobacco Plain Packaging Discussion Lights UP Again at WTO, IP
WATCH (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/02/25/tobacco-plain-packaging-discussionflames-up-again-at-wto/ [https://perma.cc/HH4R-HP4K] (noting domestic plain package legislation
in a number of countries as well as TRIPS issues, but nothing concerning potential systematic threat to
TRIPS flexibilities).
368. India seems to be one of the few countries that have expressly noted investor-state
provisions as potentially compromising TRIPS flexibilities. E.g., Josephine De Ruyck, World Health
Assembly Approves Plan to Strengthen Access to Essential Medicines, IP WATCH (May 24, 2014),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/24/world-health-assembly-approves-plan-to-strengthen-accessto-essential-medicines/ [https://perma.cc/LQ7Y-7UFZ] (India argued that TRIPS flexibility is
“under attack” through a variety of means including, but not limited to investor-state dispute settlement
provisions).
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development-friendly language, agreements could specifically add language that
incorporates the 2001 Doha Public Health Declaration, and ideally, also the
Declaration on Regulatory Sovereignty. Alternatively, interpretive statements could
be issued that clarify that TRIPS flexibilities should be considered. However,
considering that the NAFTA interpretive statement has not completely obviated
problems with tribunal decisions that defy the actual FET requirement of NAFTA,
this may be of minimal value.369
C. Increase Transparency and Access
Another important component to addressing the current conflict may be to
promote more transparency, access, and participation with respect to individual
disputes, as well as the negotiation of future agreements with investor-state
provisions. Although there has been recognition of the need for transparency, the
current situation is still largely cloaked in secrecy with limited participation. As noted
earlier, this is particularly problematic because tribunals are deciding issues of major
public concern without any accountability. In addition, given the practice of
negotiating agreements in secret, it is difficult for opposing norms and views to be
recognized, including those who can identify a conflict of regimes to participate.370
Some lessons can be learned from the EU’s recent response to public criticism
and concern of the TTIP. Although the EU had strongly defended investor-state
disputes for years in conjunction with the United States, it did bow to public
concern and initiated public consultations in an attempt to address concerns.371
Those consultations were important to the EU’s recent inclusion of an investment
court, as well as an appellate body in recent agreements, as well as its proposal to
do so in the TTIP.
Greater transparency and participation in individual disputes would also be
advantageous. Even if investment tribunals are not ultimately accountable to the
369. Joel C. Beauvais, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles &
Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 295 (2002).
370. Notably, even when a court considered some negotiations—but not draft texts—must be
public, this was still considered notable. William New, IP-Watch/Yale FOIA Case Decided: USTR Can
Keep TPP Texts Secret, But Maybe Not Communications With Industry Advisors, IP WATCH (Sept. 30,
2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/09/30/ip-watchyale-foia-case-decided-ustr-can-keep-tpptexts-secret-but-maybe-not-communications-with-industry-advisors/
[https://perma.cc/P3HNXWDQ]; Press Release, Yale Law School Information Society Project, In IP-Watch FOIA Lawsuit
Seeking Transparency on TPP Negotiations, Court Allows Government to Keep the Text of the
Agreement Secret, but is Skeptical of Efforts to Shield Industry Lobbying from Public Scrutiny
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://isp.yale.edu/node/6025 [https://perma.cc/3BP8-MTTT].
371. Compare European Commission, Incorrect Claims About Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (Oct. 3, 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151790.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ELG-WVTY] (defending traditional investor-state disputes), with European
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report: Online Public Consultation on
Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership Agreement ( Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQU8-2GN6] (providing results of public
consultation regarding proposed new EU approach to investor-to-state disputes).
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public, greater transparency could help provide tribunals with relevant
information.372 This may be particularly important since investment arbitrators tend
to be commercial lawyers with no knowledge of IP other than as an asset; in other
words, they do not view IP as inherently part of a broader balance between
corporate rights and public access and interests. In addition, since most agreements
lack any language acknowledging these principles in contrast to TRIPS, they do not
even have any textual basis for considering such interests. Granted, arbitrators may
still be inclined to favor primarily investor interests in agreements that contain no
countervailing language that expressly favors public interests. However, the
situation could at least be improved if third parties could explain the need to balance
IP rights against other values.
Although defenders of investment agreements often note that investment
tribunals may accept amicus briefs, they often fail to note that it is only under limited
circumstances that amicus briefs are accepted, and even then, the tribunal has
discretion to decline to accept briefs.373 Individual investment agreement
agreements may limit some types of amicus briefs. Indeed, in the Eli Lilly dispute,
a well-reasoned amicus brief was rejected simply because it was not authored by a
national of NAFTA, even though the proceeding has global implications.374
Although the investment tribunal in the Eli Lilly dispute was following NAFTA
guidelines, tribunals should broadly accept amicus briefs from any interested
participant, rather than limiting it to only citizens of member states. In addition,
although there is a trend towards broader access by third parties, there is still no
universal recognition of a right to amicus briefs.375 This is particularly problematic
for issues involving TRIPS, since there are necessarily global impacts. Also, notably,
unlike most domestic proceedings, as well as at the WTO, there is generally no
affirmative right for third parties, such as non-member countries to affirmatively
participate, such that there is a particular need for amicus briefs.376 In addition, for

372. E.g., Miles, supra note 87, at 296.
373. In particular, the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules as revised in 2006 allow amicus
briefs only if they provide a different perspective than the disputing parties, the submission addresses
a matter within the scope of the dispute, and the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the
proceeding. ICSID Convention, supra note 63, Arbitration Rule 37(2); see also UNCITRAL Rules of
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration art. 5 (2014); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Rise
of Arbitral Power over Domestic Courts, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 373, 411–12 (2013).
374. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on NonDisputing Party Participation, § B.1 (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
38791.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VV4-A449] (limiting Tribunal discretion to accept submissions from a
“person of a Party”); see also Eli Lilly, Procedural Order, supra note 297, at 2 (interpreting this to
excluding those who are not present in the United States, Mexico, or Canada).
375. Compare TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.22 (tribunals may accept non-disputing party amicus
curiae submissions under certain conditions), with CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.38 (tribunal shall accept
non-disputing party submissions).
376. Compare CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.38(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24 and DSU, supra note 4,
art. 4(11). Although the EU has proposed broader participation by any person with a “direct and present
interest,” it is only to support what is already sought by one of the disputing parties and still
discretionary after disputing parties have a right to comment. CETA, supra note 15, art. 23.
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participation by third parties as well as amicus briefs, greater transparency of the
entire proceedings is essential,377 rather than the historic situation where third
parties lack access to relevant documents as well as the ability to attend oral
proceedings.378 Although this principle is recognized by newer or pending
agreements, they have no direct effect on the vast majority of existing agreements.
CONCLUSION
Although these first known cases to implicate TRIPS have (so far) avoided a
direct collision, a collision of some sort seems inevitable given the existence of
thousands of agreements under which companies can assert investment claims. At
this point, it is unclear to what extent companies will bring further claims, or at least
threaten to do so to obtain results that could not be obtained under TRIPS.. This
fundamentally threatens the inherent flexibilities under TRIPS that policy makers
have been advocating countries to adopt.
This Article has aimed to shed light on this important problem so that greater
attention may be devoted to minimizing this conflict and preserving the already
limited flexibilities to promote public health under TRIPS. Importantly, even
though states “won” the initial disputes, other nations could be challenged and it is
not clear that they will necessarily win. Notably, the initial cases do not indicate that
TRIPS flexibilities are immune from investment challenges. To the contrary, the Eli
Lilly decision in particular seems to indicate that although Eli Lilly lacked adequate
facts to establish its investment claim, such a claim could exist and, in particular,
could even exist as a result of common law modifications to the law beyond denial
of justice situations.
The impact of investment disputes on TRIPS flexibilities remains to be seen.
After all, the outcomes of these initial cases were never certain. Even in retrospect,
it is not clear how to reconcile the initial decisions. It would seem that a case
involving domestic regulation of a known carcinogen would yield a unanimous
opinion in favor of the state. However, the unanimous decision was in favor of
Canada against Eli Lilly’s challenge to domestic common law. Nonetheless,
continued attention and advocacy concerning the tension between TRIPS
flexibilities and investor disputes seems especially important. Hopefully such
attention will have a positive influence on tribunalists, as well as those negotiating
agreements that could be modified to minimize harms to TRIPS flexibilities.

377. See, e.g., Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in
Investment Arbitration?, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND
REALITY 271–72 (Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (noting that amici participation without full knowledge is
unhelpful). Recent guidelines from UNICTRAL were a step forward, but requiring all documents be
made publicly accessible would be better.
378. For example, third parties do not have a right to access documents under
NAFTA. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing
Party Participation (2003), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf [https://
perma.cc/57AW-MBAS].
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However, a serious threat to TRIPS flexibilities remains and may be most
significant regarding lower profile disputes, that nonetheless may have major
repercussions for countries. For example, as this article goes to press, two additional
investment cases were discovered to have been filed, although the details are not
available because the documents are not publicly available. In one case, Ukraine
withdrew approval of a generic version of the drug sold as Sovaldi after American
pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences filed an investment dispute.379 In another,
case, Novartis filed an investment dispute against Columbia for contemplating a
compulsory license, without actually issuing one.380 The lack of transparency of
these reported cases makes it difficult to assess whether the claims have any merit.
Nonetheless, they indicate a continuing threat to TRIPS flexibilities even after the
initial “wins” in the fully litigated disputes by Uruguay and Eli Lilly.

379. E.g., Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, Pharma Corp Withdraws Investment Arbitration
After Ukraine Government Agrees to Settlement of Dispute over Monopoly Rights to Market Anti-Viral
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380. E.g., Zoe Williams, Investigation: As Colombia Pushes for Cancer Drug Price-Cut and
Considers Compulsory Licensing, Novartis Responds with Quiet Filing of an Investment Treaty Notice,
Bilaterals.org (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investigation-as-colombia-pushes
[https://perma.cc/D5HF-JB7S].

